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Ms. Burgman asserts that the unilateral conspiracy law proposed
by the American Law Institute and adopted by many states is an
unnecessary and unwise extension of traditional conspiracy law
when applied in the context of singular-defendant-plus-policeman
conspiracies. She demonstrates the inadequacy of the new ap-
proach from three perspectives: the historical, the theoretical, and
the due process. She concludes that the application of the doctrine
in such situations is contrary to the historical and theoretical un-
derpinnings of conspiracy law and is potentially abusive of due
process.
Justice Cardozo stated that the history of conspiracy exemplifies "the
tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limits of its logic." 1 With the
Model Penal Code's "unilateral approach,"' 2 adopted by many states, 3 the
* Member, Indiana Bar. B.A., J.D., Valparaiso University.
1. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1932).
2. The pertinent section reads:
(1) Definition of Conspiracy. A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person
or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its
commission he
(a) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them
will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation
to commit such crime; or
(b) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of
such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) [hereinafter cited as MODEL PENAL
CODE).
3. Thirty states have adopted statutes that conform to the Model Penal Code provisions on
unilateral conspiracy. In some instances the unilateral approach has been embraced by the
judiciary. The harmony of statute and case law appears in,: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-48
(West 1972) and State v. Marra, 174 Conn. 338 (1978) (only the accused's intent to commit
larceny relevant to the conspiracy charge); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 511-13 (1974) and Saienoi
v. State, 346 A.2d 152 (Del. 1975) (agent's lack of intent does not preclude conspiracy convic-
tion of defendant who solicited agent to commit murder); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-5-2 (Burns
1979) and Garcia v. State, - Ind. -, 394 N.E.2d 106 (1979) (conspiracy conviction upheld
although the only pers6n with whom she conspired was an informant who feigned acquiescence
in the scheme); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.175 (West 1980 Supp.) and State v. Happel, -
Minn. -, 259 N.W.2d 600 (1977) (defendant can be convicted of conspiracy even if those he
agreed with cannot); MONT. CRIM. CODE § 94-4-102 (1973) and MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §
94-4-102 (1973 Special Pamph.) and State v. Cripps, 582 P.2d 312 (Mont. 1978) (acquittal of
co-defendants on conspiracy conviction did not affect status of remaining defendant's conspiracy
conviction); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105 (McKinney 1975) and People v. Smith, 61 A.D.2d 91, 401
N.Y.S.2d 353 (1978) (only intent of defendant is relevant to charge of conspiracy to commit
murder).
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law of' conspiracy has expanded itself beyond those limits. By examining the
new crime from three critical perspectives, this article demonstrates that
unilateral conspiracy is inconsistent with the historical development and
logic of the common law conspiracy doctrine, and that it is potentially abu-
sive of due process guarantees.
The unilateral approach assesses the subjective, individual behavior of a
defendant in determining guilt or innocence. 4 Such a determination
renders irrelevant the conviction, acquittal, irresponsibility, or immunity of
There is no relevant case law since the enactment of these statutes embracing the unilateral
conspiracy concept: ALA. CODE tit. 13A, § 4-3 (1978 Crim. Code); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
3-1063 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-707 (1977); HAWAII REV. STA'rT. § 705-520 (1976); Ky.
RE\'. STAT. § 506.040 (1975 Penal Code); ME. RE\'. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 151 (1971); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 564.016 (Vernon 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-202 (Supp. 1977); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 629:3 (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1.06-04 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2923.01 (Page 1978 Supp.); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.450 (1977); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 4,
§ 15.02 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-201 (1978); VA. CODE § 18.2-22 (1975 Re-
placement Vol.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.28.040 (1977).
Some states have adopted the unilateral approach by statute, but their judiciaries do not
appear to be following the Model Penal Code approach. Compare COLO. REV. STA'I. § 18-2-201
(1973) with People v. Johnson, 189 Colo. 28, 536 P.2d 44 (1975) (relationship between co-
conspirators Must involve genuine agreement and confederation); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.04
(West 1976) and People v. Wilkinson, 38 Colo. App. 365, 561 P.2d 347 (1976) (to prove conspi-
racy, a common design and intent must be proven among all actors) with Ramirez v. State, 371
So. 2d 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (crime of conspiracy must involve agreement and inten-
tion to commit crime among all actors) and Slater v. State, 356 So. 2d 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (criminal intent on part of all actors necessary for conspiracy conviction) and Pearce v.
State, 330 So. 2d 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (conspiracy conviction reversed when co-
defendants were acquitted of conspiracy charges); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-2 (1977) with
People v. Ambrose, 28 I11. App. 3d 627, 329 N.E.2d 11 (1975) (sustained conviction of conspi-
racy because co-conspirator, turned informer, at one time had necessary intent to commit
armed robbery); MICH. Cosp. LAWS. ANN. § 759.175a (1968) with People v. Berry, 84 Mich.
App. 604, 269 N.W.2d 694 (1978) (no conspiracy if alleged co-conspirators are acquitted); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-2 (West 1979) with State v. Mazur, 158 N.J. Super. 89, 385 A.2d 878 (1978)
(conspiracy requires specific intent on the part of at least two persons); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
30-28-2 (1978) with State v. Ross, 86 N.M. 212, 521 P.2d 1161 (Ct. App. 1974) (common design
and mutual understanding is necessary for conspiracy conviction) and State v. Dressel, 85 N.M.
450, 513 P.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1973) (common design to accomplish unlawful purpose is essence of
conspiracy); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 903 (Purdon 1973) with Commonwealth v. Dolfi, 396
A.2d 635 (1979) (mutual criminal responsibility and intent required for conspiracy conviction)
and Commonwealth v. Henderson, 249 Pa. Super. Ct. 472, 378 A.2d 193 (1977) (common
understanding is essential to conspiracy conviction); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.31 (West 1958) with
Hawpetoss v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 71, 187 N.W.2d 823 (1971) (conscious intent of each actor to
attain criminal objective is required for criminal conviction).
The unilateral approach is rejected both by the language of the statute and the subsequent
cases in many states. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3302 (1974) and State v. Crozier, 225
Kan. 120, 587 P.2d 331 (1978) (actual agreement and meeting of minds required for conspiracy
conviction); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3201 (1977) and Eberheart v. State, 232 Ga. 247, 206 S.E.2d
12 (1974), vacated on other grounds, 433 U.S. 917 (1977), modified on other grounds, 239 Ga.
407, 238 S.E.2d 1 (1977) (agreement and common design are necessary fbr conspiracy convic-
tion).
4. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 2, § 5.04(1)(a).
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other co-conspirators. 5 To that extent, the new law follows judicial exten-
sions consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the common law
crime. 6  But the application of unilateral conspiracy does not end there. The
most unsettling aspect of the crime, and the one to which this article is
addressed, arises in the case of a "feigned agreement"-that is, a case in
which one of two 7 alleged "conspirators" is, unknown to the defendant, an
undercover police agent or a police informant. In such a case the unilateral
model statute and the relevant cases it has spawned call for the prosecution
of the single defendant based on the defendant's subjective belief that he or
she was conspiring. 8
This approach ignores the historical rationale of the common law crime of
conspiracy: the threat to society of two or more persons pursuing crime.
When one of two conspirators has no intention of pursuing the criminal ob-
jective, the rationale for increased punishment is absent. Therefore, al-
though this latest extension of the law appears logical when viewed alongside
its judicial precursors, it actually defies its own reason.9 While the move
may be heralded as a step toward more effective law enforcement, it is not
justified because society's interest in punishing such conduct is already met
by the charges of solicitation and attempt.10
5. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 488-90 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as LAFAVE & SCOTT].
6. Insofar as it eliminates the nullifying effect of an inconsistent verdict, as in Martinez v.
People, 129 Col. 94, 267 P.2d 654 (1954), or the inability to prosecute another defendant, as in
Rosenthal v. United States, 45 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir. 1930), the unilateral approach seems a
plausible extension of the Fox rule. The Fox rule obviates the need to dismiss a conspiracy
charge against one defendant when a nolle prosequi has been filed as to the other defendant.
United States v. Fox, 130 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 666 (1942).
7. Of course, if there are more than two members, there is no problem in finding a legiti-
mate conspiracy, provided more than one member is not knowingly working with the police.
See, e.g., State v. Wilkins, 34 N.C. App. 392, 238 S.E.2d 659 (1977); State v. Horton, 275 N.C.
651, 657, 170 S.E.2d 466, 470 (1969). But see Beasley v. State, 360 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978). In Beasley, a lone defendant was convicted for conspiring with two government
agents. The court based its decison on the fact that one of the two agents was not authorized to
deal in drugs.
8. State v. St. Christopher, 305 Minn. 226, 232 N.W.2d 798 (1975); Saienni v. State, 346
A.2d 152 (Del. 1975).
9. [T]he criminal law of today, throughout the world, is made up more or less of
successive strata of rules, institutions, traditional modes of thought, and legislative
provisions representing different and inconsistent ideas of the end of criminal law,
the purpose of penal treatment, and the nature of crime. This is true especially in
Anglo-American criminal law. With us all stages of development and all theories
and all manner of combinations of them are represented in rules and doctrines
which the courts are called upon to administer. Indeed, all or many of them may
be represented in legislative acts bearing the same date. . . . [Olur criminal law is
not internally consistent, much less homogenous and well organized.
R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE AMERICAN CITY-A SUMMARY 30-31 (1922), (1967).
10. See People v. Lanni, 95 Misc. 2d 4, 7-8, 406 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1013 (1978). Contrast the
determination of a Presidential commission that no new substantive criminal laws are necessary
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Moreover, because the crime of unilateral conspiracy inevitably punishes
predisposition to commit crime, without the safeguards incorporated in
bilateral conspiracy, it opens the door to entrapment. Unfortunately, recent
judicial treatment of the entrapment defense has curtailed its effective-
ness.11 Courts that have considered the entrapment issue in the context of
unilateral conspiracy cases have dismissed it summarily 12 or, -after discus-
sion, have deemed it inapplicable. 13 In addition, the precise elements of
the new crime are unclear, 14 as is often the legislative intent concerning the
new statutes. 15 Courts, therefore, have had difficulty in rendering consist-
ent interpretation. Resulting problems of due process compel a serious re-
thinking of the model law.
This article focuses on the model law from three standpoints: the histori-
cal, theoretical, and due process perspectives. The first two perspectives
demonstrate that unilateral conspiracy is an altogether new crime, explaina-
ble only superficially as a logical and necessary form of conspiracy. The final
perspective examines the law's potential for oppression and the lack of judi-
cial or legislative safeguards to prevent the miscarriage of justice that the
original crime sought to prevent.
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Conspiracy originated, ironically, as a preventive remedy for abuse of the
legal process. One of the initial statutes was the Ordinacio de Con-
to fight organized crime, as conspiracy law is quite adequate. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCI-
ETY 200. This disparity can be resolved only when it is recognized that unilateral conspiracy
aims at singular, rather than organized, defendants: it permits the law to trick them into "or-
ganizing" and then punishes them for doing so.
11. See, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); Russell v. United States, 411
U.S. 423 (1973); United States v. Graves, 556 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
923 (1978); United States v. Swets, 563 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022
(1978); People v. Sanchez, 580 P.2d 1270 (Colo. App. 1978); State v. Dickinson, 370 So. 2d 762
(Fla. 1979); State v. Ziegler, 19 Wash..App. 119, 575 P.2d 723 (1978). But see People v. Spahr,
56 III. App. 3d 434, 371 N.E.2d 1261 (1978).
12. See People v. Lanni, 95 Misc. 2d 4, 7, 406 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1013 (1978). Cf. King v.
State, 104 So.2d 730, 732 (Fla. 1958) (possible entrapment recognized but not used as basis for
decision).
13. See State v. Lavary, 152 N.J. Super. 413, 419, 377 A.2d 1255, 1258 (1977), revd on
other grounds, 163 N.J. Super. 576, 395 A.2d 524 (1978).
14. The Code makes no attempt to define its terms. The absence of any definition of
"agreement" is particularly troubling. Notwithstanding the absence of a clear statutory state-
ment of the elements of the offense, at least one court has said the elements are the same as
those under a bilateral definition. See, e.g., People v. Schwimmer, 66 A.D.2d 91, 411 N.Y.S.2d
922, 924 (1978).
15. See, e.g., Garcia v.State, -. Ind.-., 394 N.E.2d 106 (1979); People v. Lanni, 95 Misc.
2d 4, 14-15, 406 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1017 (1978).
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spiratoribus. 16 This statute did not precisely define "conspiracy" but was
directed against combinations or confederacies for false and malicious promo-
tions of indictments and pleas, embracery, and maintenance.7 Moreover,
rather than creating a substantive crime, the statute created a writ that a
party could use as a form of post-trial relief. This early conspiracy law's most
striking distinction is its time element. The early statute permitted legal
intervention only after the seeker of the writ had been indicted and acquit-
ted,1 8 whereas under the modern timing concept of conspiracy the law in-
tervenes before real harm is done. 19 Thus, the requirement of an agree-
ment, which has come to be known as the "gist of the offense," 2 0 was origi-
nally only one part of the proscribed evil.
The shift of focus to the evil agreement came in 1611 in the Poulterers'
Case,2 1 where the Star Chamber treated conspiracy as a substantive crime
rather than a writ. Consequently, conspiracy became punishable once the
agreement had been made, and government intervention occurred at a much
earlier juncture. In deciding the Poulterers' Case in this manner, the Star
Chamber created a potent weapon for quelling group activity aimed at sub-
verting justice. That court, however, was not willing to contain its new in-
vention, 22 and it expanded the concept further to include acts that were
deemed contrary to public policy or merely "mischievous." 23
16. The relevant portion of the statute reads:
Conspirators be they that do confeder or bind themselves by oath covenant or other
alliance that every one of them shall aid and support the enterprise of each other
falsely and maliciously to indict, or cause to be indicted or falsely to acquit people,
or falsely to move or maintain pleas; and also such as cause children within age to
appeal men of felony, whereby they are imprisoned and sore grieved and such as
retain men in the country with liveries and fees for to maintain their malicious
enterprises and to suppress the truth; and this extendeth as well to the takers as to
the givers. And stewards and bailiffs of great lords, which by their seignory office or
power undertake to bear or maintain quarrels, pleas, or debates for other matters
than such as touch the estate of their lords or themselves.
A Definition of Conspirators, 33 Edw. I, Stat. 2 (1304).
17. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 625 (1941) [hereinafter
cited as Harno].
18. See note 16 supra.
19. That is, the law intervenes before the object is completed. It is generally conceded that,
as with attempt, the conspiracy itself is a harmful act.
20. See, e.g., Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942); United States v.
Fruehauf Corp., 577 F.2d 1038 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Anderson, 542 F.2d 428 (7th
Cir. 1976); Jordan v. United States, 370 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1966); People v. Gem Hang, 131
Cal. App. 2d 69, 280 P.2d 28 (1955); People v. Brownstein, 109 Cal. App. 2d 891, 241 P.2d
1056 (1952); People v. Edwards, 74 I11. App. 2d 225, 219 N.E.2d 382 (1966); State v. Olson, 249
Iowa 536, 86 N.W.2d 214 (1958); People v. Wellman, 6 Mich. App. 573, 149 N.W.2d 908
(1967).
21. 77 Eng. Rep. 813, 814 (K.B. 1611).
22. Harno, supra note 17, at 626.
23. W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 382 (1926).
1979]
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After the Restoration, this concept eventually found its way into the comn-
mon law courts, 2 4 although there was some objection. 25  By 1721, the con-
cept had been expanded even further to include agreements to commit acts
that were not wrongful in themselves.2 6 Mulcahy v. Regina 27 articulated a
somewhat vague definition of conspiracy that included agreements to ac-
complish lawful ends by unlawful means.28 But Mulcahy accomplished
something even more significant: it made clear that evil intent was not the
gravamen of the offense. Rather, the agreement was what posed a threat to
society, for in union there was strength.
29
Even before the Mulcahy explication in England, the United States courts
had embraced group danger as the proscribed element of conspiracy.
Philadelphia Cordwainers, 30 believed to have been the first American case
of conspiracy, involved a labor strike called by shoemaker apprentices in an
effort to raise their wages. While the court could find no agreement to
commit a crime, it nevertheless convicted the men, focusing on their con-
certed actions, stating that "a combination ...maintaining one another, car-
rying a particular object . . . is criminal," and that "an act innocent in an
individual, is rendered criminal by a confederacy to effect it."31 Thereafter,
American courts, armed with the crime of conspiracy, continued their war
on the labor movement until the 1930s. 32 After organized labor was legiti-
mated, communists became the favorite target of conspiracy prosecutions.
Interestingly, the defendant-communists were charged with conspiring to
advocate the forcible overthrow of the government. 33 The crux of this of-
fense was unmistakably further removed from an "act" than were any previ-
ous conspiracy offenses; 34 the focus of the crime was on the number of per-
sons involved rather than on the activity in which they were engaged.
Yet the idea of discounting numbers of conspirators, as incorporated in the
unilateral conspiracy model, did not arise as a sudden aberration amidst the
prosecution of various groups. It has surfaced from time to time throughout
the past two centuries. 35 Nevertheless, all singular-defendant American
24. Starlings Case, I Sid. 174, 82 Eng, Rep. 1039 (1664).
25. Regina v. Daniell, 6 Mod. 99, 37 Eng. Rep. 856 (1704).
26. Rex v. Journeymen Taylors of Cambridge, 8 Mod. 10, 88 Eng. Rep. 9, (1721).
27. L.R. 3 E. & 1. App. 306 (1868).
28. Id. at 317.
29. id.
30. 3 COMMONS & GILMORE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
59, cited in Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARv. L. REV. 393, 413 (1922).
31. Id. at 414.
32. See generally R. FERGUSON & A. STOKKE, CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 139 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as FERGUSON & STOKKE]; J. LANDIS & M. MANOFF, CASES ON LABOR LAW
(2d ed. 1942). See also Commonwealth v. Carlisle, Brightley's N.P. Rep. (Pa.) 36 (1821) (illus-
trates fear of organized numbers of persons).
33. See id.
34. FERGUSON & STOKKE, sutpra note 32, at 139.
35. A detailed accounting of cases from various English-speaking countries is found in Frid-
man, Mens Rea in Conspiracy, 19 MOD. L. REV. 276 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Fridman]. In
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cases involved conspiracies where one defendant was dead,3 6 insane,3 7 ac-
quitted of the same charge, 38 granted immunity in exchange for testimony, 39
or the like. 40  In none of these cases was the singular defendant a person
who had "conspired" with a law officer. In fact, the drafters of the Code
provision on unilateral conspiracy cited only a Canadian case41 in support of
their view. The general rule derived from the diverse unilateral cases was
that proof of two guilty minds was necessary to maintain a conspiracy pro-
secution against one defendant. 42 The courts held fast to this rule for many
years.
The rule was not without its critics. Some scholars suggested the law was
illogical, as the charged defendant did have the specific intent to form a
conspiracy. *a  In response to criticisms of the general rule, the American
that article, the author attempted to treat all types of unilateral cases alike. Apparently this was
the first time such an analysis was made.
36. See, e.g., Joyce v. United States, 153 F.2d 364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 860
(1946); People v. Nail, 242 111. 284, 89 N.E. 1012 (1909); State v. Simon, 101 N.J.L. 11, 127 A.
570 (1924); People v. Olcott, 2 Johns Cas. 301 (N.Y. 1801); State v. Davenport, 227 N.C. 475,
42 S.E.2d 686 (1947); State v. Alridge, 206 N.C. 850, 175 S.E. 191 (1934); Commonwealth v.
Bonnem, 95 Pa. Super. Ct. 496 (1928).
37. See Regle v. State, 9 Md. App. 346, 264 A.2d 119 (1970).
38. See, e.g., United States v. .Postma, 242 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1957); Worthington v. United
States, 64 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1933); People v. James, 189 Cal. App. 2d 14, 10 Cal. Rptr. 809
(1961); Martinez v. People, 129 Colo. 94, 267 P.2d 654 (1954); People v. Nathanson, 389 Ill.
311, 59 N.E.2d 677 (1945); State v. Lockhart, 241 Iowa 635, 39 N.W.2d 636 (1949); Hurwitz v.
State, 200 Md. 578, 92 A.2d 575 (1952); State v. Raper, 204 N.C. 503, 168 S.E. 831 (1933).
39. See, e.g., People v. Gilbert, 26 Cal. App. 2d 1, 78 P.2d 770 (1938); People v. Bryant,
409 111. 467, 100 N.E.2d 598 (1951); Berry v. State, 202 Ind. 294, 173 N.E. 705 (1930); Hurwitz
v. State, 200 Md. 578, 92 A.2d 575 (1952).
40. For instance, where the other conspirator was a "person unknown,'" the prosecution
would lie. See, e.g., Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 339
U.S. 974 (1950); People v. Sagehorn, 140 Cal. App. 2d 138, 294 P.2d 1062 (1956); State v.
Caldwell, 249 N.C. 56, 105 S.E.2d 189 (1958). Similary, the prosecution would lie if the co-
conspirator had not yet been apprehended. Note, however, that in all these cases the prosecu-
tion was required to prove that the defendant had made a conspiratorial agreement with the
other person. Both of them had to be shown to have agreed to the plan. See, e.g., United
States v. Lance, 536 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1976). See also note 6 supra.
41. Rex v. Kotyszyn, 95 Can. C.C. 261 (1949). Actually, the case did not support the prop-
osition; it merely showed that such a prosecution had at one time been brought. In Kotyszyn, a
policewoman pretended to be pregnant and sought an abortion from the accused. The court
held that the defendant could not be convicted because the crucial element of conspiracy was
missing-agreement to commit an unlawful act.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907
(1967); Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1965); King v. State, 104 So.2d 730 (Fla.
1958); People v. Atley, 392 Mich. 298, 220 N.W.2d 465 (1974); Moore v. State, 290 So.2d 603
(Miss. 1974); Johnson v. Sheriff, Clark County, 91 Nev. 161, 532 P.2d 1037 (1975); State v.
Horton, 275 N.C. 651, 170 S.E.2d 466 (1969); Delaney v. State, 164 Tenn. 432, 51 S.W.2d 485
(1932); Odneal v. State, 117 Tex. Crim. 97, 34 S.W.2d 595 (1931); Woodworth v. State, 20 Tex.
Crim. 375 (1886).
43. See generally G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW-THE GENERAL PART 672-73 (2d ed.
1961). See also Fridman, supra note 35, at 282-83. The advocates of the general rule appear to
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Law Institute, by a vote of fourteen to eleven, propounded section 5.03,
which contains tile unilateral approach to conspiracy prosecution. 44  Since
its promulgation, many of the states have adopted that section.
45  It is not
clear, however, that these states intended the result of conviction in cases
involving government agents, as the unilateral theory extends to many other
types of situations.
46
The federal government has not accepted the unilateral theory; the federal
statute remains bilateral. 47  The United States Supreme Court has held that
outnumber the critics. See, e.g., R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 546 (2d ed. 1969); F. WHARTON,
CRIMINAL LAwV & PROCEDURE § 83 (12th ed. 1974); Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agree-
ment in Theory and Practice, 65 GEo. L.J. 925, 957-62 (1977); Orchard, "Agreement" in Crimi-
nal Conspiracy, 1974 CRIM. L. REv. 297, 298.
44. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03, comment 2, at 105 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1958) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft)].
45. See note 3 supra. It is questionable whether the courts of the various states could have
changed the definition of conspiracy so radically. Without a specific directive from their legisla-
tures, such a move hy the courts sua sponte would deprive criminal defendants of their rights
under the law. An excellent example of such a situation is Shaw v. D.P.P. (The Ladies Direc-
tor) Case), (1962) A.C. 220 (C.C.A. 1962). In this country, the ex post facto clause of the
Constitution prevents such judicial activism in criminal cases. James v. United States, 366 U.S.
213, 223-25 (1961) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. Some states have adopied a "no defense" commentary, such as the following one, to
explain their intent:
It is no defense to a prosecution for criminal conspiracy that, because of irresponsi-
bility or other legal incapacity or exemption, or because of unawareness of the crim-
inal nature of the agreement or the conduct contemplated or of the defendant's
criminal purpose, or because of other factors precluding the mental state required
for commission of the conspiracy or the crime contemplated, one or more of the
defendant's co-conspirators could not be guilty of the conspiracy or the crime con-
templated.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 523(2) (1974). The Delaware Supreme Court relied upon this statute
in Saienni v. State, 346 A.2d 152, 154 (Del. 1975), and stated: "Defendant argues that he
cannot be guilty of conspiracy with an established police informer and an undercover agent who
had no intention of committing the crime. We find no merit in this argument .
Indiana's "no defense" clause reads:
It is no defense that the person with whom the accused person is alleged to have
conspired:
(1) has not been prosecuted;
(2) has not been convicted;
(3) has been acquitted;
(4) has been convicted of a different crime;
(5) cannot be prosecuted for any reason; or
(6) lacked the capacity to commit the crime.
IND. CODE § 35-41-5- 2 (c) (Burns 1979). This clause was relied upon in Garcia v. State, Ind.
-, 394 N.E.2d 106, 109 (1979).
47. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). The federal statute provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit an, offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined nor more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
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a corrupt agreement between not fewer than two persons, each having the
requisite mens rea, is necessary to sustain a conspiracy indictment,48 and
that acquittal of one defendant mandates a dismissal of the other defend-
ant. 49  Congress did, however, recently consider a new, unilateral statute.
The proposed Federal Criminal Code Reform Act, which was passed by the
Senate,50 died in the House. 5  The Senate bill textually comprehended the
unilateral theory, but the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the pro-
posed law contemplated no change in the "well-established case law" on the
meaning of the terms "conspiracy" and "agreement."5 2  Clearly, the "well-
established case law" in the federal arena mandates a bilateral definition of
conspiracy. This contradiction, coupled with fervent criticism from the
American Civil Liberties Union,5 3 confronted the House. Thus, the bilateral
federal law is not likely to be abrogated so quickly as the bilateral state
statutes.
THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Conspiracy is often defined as an agreement between two or more persons
to commit a crime or to do something which is itself not unlawful by unlaw-
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy,
is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the
maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
id.
48. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 92 (1934). In this case, the Court defined "conspi-
racy" generally although the prosecution was brought under a specific state statute. The Court
noted that "it is impossible in the nature of things for a man to conspire with himself... In
California as elsewhere, conspiracy imports a corrupt agreement between not less than two with
guilty knowledge on the part of each." Id. at 92. The holding was cited by the dissent as
authority for denying a unilateral approach in People v. Schwimmer, 66 A.D.2d 91, 102, 411
N.Y.S.2d 922, 929 (1978) (Titone, J., dissenting).
49. Morrison v, California, 291 U.S. at 93.
50. S. 1723, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See 124 CONG. REC. 5860 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1978).
51. 37 CONG. Q. 1899 (Sept. 1, 1979).
52. S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 163 (1977).
53. A spokesman for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) testified as follows:
A second important change which S. 1723 makes in current conspiracy law is its
adoption of the unilateral approach to the offense. At common law, and under the
current federal conspiracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 371), the crime of conspiracy is
defined as the situation in which "two or more persons conspire .... Thus, an
actual agreement is an essential element of the offense and must be established
before one is liable for conspiracy. One could not conspire with, for example, an
undercover agent. Requiring an actual agreement is consistent with the purpose of
conspiracy law, that is, to prevent the formation of dangerous criminal relationships.
Separate laws for conspiracy have been justified on the ground that partnership in
crime presents a greater danger to society than does an individual acting in isola-
tion. S. 1722 rejects this traditional "true agreement" requirement, and reaches
"unilateral" conspiracies. This "unilateral" approach represents an unwarranted de-
parture from current federal conspiracy law, which is consistent with the principles
historically invoked to justify separate conspiracy statutes. S. 1723 maintains the
bilateral agreement requirement.
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ful means.1 4  The gist of the crime of conspiracy is the agreement to do an
act, rather than the act itself.5 5  Underlying the rule is the assumption that
collective action toward an antisocial end constitutes a greater threat to soci-
ety than does individual action: 56 each conspirator increases the other con-
spirator's probability of successfully committing a crime. 5 7
The crime of conspiracy has two dimensions. As an inchoate offense, it
permits law enforcement intervention before the planned substantive crime
is completed. 58 As a substantive crime in itself, it punishes the special
danger presented by criminal confederation. 5 9  In order to understand the
theory of criminal conspiracy it is necessary to analyze the reasoning con-
structs supporting the idea of inherent risk in group activity. These doctrines
will then provide a matrix for analysis of the logic of the unilateral approach.
Conspiracy Rationales
At least five distinct theories have been advanced to justify the charge of
conspiracy. Each pointedly addresses the threat inherent in group activity,
thereby suggesting the need to treat conspiracy as both an inchoate and a
substantive offense. Because each theory recognizes the threat of group ac-
Hearings on S.1722 and S.1723 Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979) (statement of J. Shattuck and D. Landau, ACLU) (hearings unpublished).
In their testimony before the House of Representatives the spokesmen praised the retention, in
one proposal, of the bilateral approach. Otherwise, their testimony was nearly identical to that
given before the Senate. Hearings on the Working Draft of the Fed. Crim. Code Revision
Before the Subcommn. on Crim. Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) (statement of J. Shattuck and D. Landau) (hearings unpublished).
Indeed, the House's own proposal is said to have been drafted to meet the concerns of civil
libertarians. 37 CONG. Q. 2017 (Sept. 15, 1979).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Flynn, 103 F. Supp. 925 (C.D.N.Y. 1952); State v. Jennings,
195 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 1972); State v. Oliver, 268 N.C. 280, 150 N.E.2d 445 (1966).
This was a common law definition of conspiracy, first enunciated in 1832 by Lord Denman in
Rex v. Jones, 110 Eng. Rep. 485, 487 (1832). Some states retain this standard in case law and
statute. Others have limited the offense to criminal objectives. See generally LAFAvE & SCOTT,
supra note 5, at 454.
55. See Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112. 120 (1932). Accord, United States v. Nims,
524 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Carlton, 475 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581, (2d Cir. 1940); People v. Welch, 89 Cal. App. 18,
21, 264 P. 324, 325 (1928).
56. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 535 (1957); Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspi-
racy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 923-24 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
A purely technical result of the conspiracy requirement that there be an agreement between
two or more persons was the common law rule that a husband and wife, being "one person,"
could not be guilty of conspiracy absent a third participant. See, e.g., Dawson v. United States,
10 F.2d 106 (9th Cir. 1926). However, the modern trend has been to abandon this principle.
See, e.g., United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960); Pegram v. United States, 361 F.2d 820
(8th Cir. 1966); People v. Martin, 4 Ill. 2d 105, 122 N.E.2d 245 (1954).
57. See notes 64, 65, and accompanying text infra.
58. See notes 19-29 and accompanying text supra.
59. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 5, § 61, at 459.
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tivity, it is plain that the crime of conspiracy is based on that one founda-
tion.
Psychological reinforcement. This is the most frequently cited reason for
penalizing conspiracy. 6 ° It is said that the plurality of members not only
solidifies the decision to commit the crime, but also exerts social pressure
against an individual's decision to postpone or reject the crime's commis-
sion. 61  The group provides moral support. 62  As a result, even if one
member withdraws from the conspiracy, other conspirators may still com-
plete the act that the original member helped set in motion. 63
Effectiveness. There is a greater likelihood of accomplishing the crime due
to the increased number of participants. 64  This conclusion is drawn from
the idea that the existence of numbers facilitates division of labor, which
promotes the efficiency with which a given object can be pursued, and so
makes possible the attainment of objects more elaborate and ambitious than
otherwise would be attainable. 65
Degree of harm. Somewhat related to the rationale of "effectiveness" is
the notion that the increase in numbers is likely to result in more harm than
that which would be produced by an individual acting alone. 66
Focal Point. The existence of a group for criminal purposes provides a
continuing focal point for further crimes, either related or unrelated to those
immediately planned. 67  Conspiracy "involves deliberate plotting to subvert
the laws, educating and preparing the conspirators for further and habitual
criminal practices." 68
Societal apprehensiveness. In addition to the above-mentioned concerns,
all of which involve a certain apprehension of conscious harm, there is also
60. See generally Developments, supra note 56.
61. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 778 (1975); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S.
587, 593-94 (1961); Prim, The Mens Rea Requirement for Conspiracy: The Model Penal Code
and the Progressive Law of Judge Learned Hand, 40 Mo. L. REV. 467, 468 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Prim]; Developments, supra note 56, at 924.
62. Note, Criminal Conspiracy: Bearing of Overt Acts upon the Nature of the Crime, 37
HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1924).
63. Developments, supra note 56, at 924.
64. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. at 593-94. See also lannelli v. United States, 420
U.S. at 778; Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of
Individual Defendants, 62 HARV. L. REV. 276, 283-84 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Conspiracy
Dilenna].
65. Developments, supra note 56, at 924. See also Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. at
593-94; Conspiracy Dilemma, supra note 64, at 283-84. Accord, lannelli v. United States, 420
U.S. at 778.
66. M. BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw 213 (1978) [hereinafter cited as BAS-
SIOUNI].
67. See lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. at 778; Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. at
593-94.
68. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915). This is probably more applicable
to "organized crime" than to a two-member conspiracy.
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concern for the fear experienced by the public through awareness that con-
spiracies exist.69
In light of these theories, the unilateral approach is inaccurately employed
to define as conspiracy the combination of one defendant and one govern-
ment agent. First, it is highly unlikely that such a combination produces
enough psychological reinforcement to bring about the commission of the
plotted crime, as the feigning conspirator invariably crushes the plan before
any real harm is done. Notwithstanding this objection, the drafters of the
Model Penal Code cited the psychological reinforcement rationale as a jus-
tification for their unilateral theory, stating that "sharing lends fortitude to
purpose." 70  They then remarked that others may be spurred to complete
the crime without the feigning party. 7 1 What this analysis ignores is the fact
that the feigning party's encouragement in such a case does not add to the
probability that the criminal object will be achieved. The confidence in-
spired by the decoy is a fhlse confidence that results in failure rather than
success. Thus, some courts rejecting a unilateral treatment of such cases
have pointed out that rather than to bolster the plan the government agent
is there to "frustrate" it. 72
Of course, the situation is somewhat different where the feigning party is
not a government agent but rather is a conspirator-turned-informant. Some
psychological support is initially given. Recognizing this, the prosecution in
one case 7 3 argued that a conspiracy did exist because the informer did not
take on that role until after the conspiracy 74 was complete. 75  The court
69. Developm nts, supra note 56, at 925. It has been suggested that due to public awareness
some courts impose cumulative sentences for conspiracy in addition to the crime that was the
object of the conspiracy. Id. The Supreme Court has upheld this practice. See, e.g., United
States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693 (1975); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. at 593-97; Pink-
erton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643-44 (1946). Indeed, the Court has stated that the
penalty for conspiracy may justifiably be greater than the penalty imposed for the accomplished
substantive crime. See lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. at 778; Clone v. United States, 159
U.S. 590, 595 (1895). "[L]iability for conspiracy is not taken away by its success." Asgill v.
United States, 60 F.2d 776, 777 (4th Cir. 1932). On the other hand, attempt is merged with the
substantive crime. United States v. York, 578 F.2d 1036, 1040 (5th Cir. 1978). The fact that a
conspiracy conviction will not merge with a conviction for the substantive offense, which per-
mits possible double punishment, does not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Ian-
nelli v. United States, 420 U.S. at 782-84.
70. MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft), supra note 44, § 5.03, comments at 97.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Wray, 8 F.2d 429 (N.D. Ga. 1925); State v. Mazur, 158 N.J.
Super. 89, 97, 385 A.2d 878, 882-83 (1978).
73. Moore v. State, 290 So. 2d 603 (Miss. 1974).
74. It is clear that the court used the word "conspiracy" as synonymous with "agreement."
Id. at 605.
75. Id. The state based its argument on United States v. Sacco, 436 F.2d 780, 783 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 834 (1971), in which the court stated that although one of the con-




found, however, that the party "entered into the conspiracy for the sole
purpose of aiding law enforcement officers" by informing. It therefore held
that the informer could not be counted in identifying the requisite number
of persons for a conspiracy. 76  Regardless of this careful time-of-intent ap-
proach, the rationale of "psychological reinforcment" is not met in such a
situation. Commission of the planned crime-the evil that "psychological
reinforcement" supposedly facilitates- never materializes because the plan
is quelled.
7 7
A similar result obtains when the factor of "effectiveness" is analyzed. In
fact, the American Law Institute noted this shortcoming in its published
comments on the proposed draft:
Where the person with whom the defendant conspired secretly intends
not to go through with the plan. . . . Under the unilateral approach of the
Draft, the culpable party's guilt would not be affected by the fact that the
other party's agreement was feigned .... True enough, the project's
chances of success have not been increased by the agreement; indeed, its
doom may have been sealed by this turn of events. But the major basis of
conspiratorial liability-the unequivocal evidence of a firm purpose to
comm it a crime-remains the same.78
In actuality, a "firm purpose to commit a crime" is not the keystone of con-
spiratorial liability. It is essential to the crime of conspiracy that there be
more than mere intent; there must be a uniting with another who also in-
tends to carry out the plan. This is the essence of conspiracy, 7 9 and no
76. 290 So. 2d at 607.
77. In People v. Schwimmer, 66 A.D.2d 91, 411 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1978), the court attempted
to use the "psychological reinforcement" rationale to support its approval of the unilateral ap-
proach. The court said:
[Tlhe mere belief that combination has occurred is sufficient to have produced the
undesirable effects. Certainly the culpable actor's expectations are aroused and his
criminal resolve will be strengthened. The mere appearance of group support may
be sufficient to increase the likelihood that the culpable actor will himself attempt
to accomplish the criminal objective.
Id. at 96, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 926. Further, the court noted that the rationale is particularly ap-
propriate where the individual defendant is the originator of the plan. Id. However, the opinion
ignored the fact that unilateral prosecution is not limited to such situations.
78. MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft), supra note 44, comments at 104-05. See also State
v. Lavary, 152 N.J. Super. 413, 377 A.2d 1255 (1977), revd, 163 N.J. Super. 576, 395 A.2d 524
(1978); State v. St. Christopher, 305 Minn. 226, 232 N.W.2d 798 (1975).
79. See lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. at 777; United States v. Cantu, 557 F.2d 1173,
1176 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Van Hee, 531 F.2d 352, 357 (6th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Butler, 494 F.2d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 1974); People v. Jayne, 52 I11. App. 3d 990,
1004, 368 N.E.2d 422, 432 (1977); Commonwealth v. Edison, 249 Pa. Super. Ct. 472, 483, 378
A.2d 393, 398 (1977). Although a common design is necessary, it is not required that each party
know the conspiracy's entire scope or all of its details. See, e.g., United States v. Fuel, 583
F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Rosenblatt, 554 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1977);
Lefco v. United States, 74 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir. 1934).
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amount of legal legerdemain can circumvent it. It is therefore plain that the
"effectiveness" rationale is absent in the context of unilateral conspiracy.
Furthermore, the "increased-degree-of-harm" rationale likewise offers no
support for the unilateral conspiracy theory. It may be useful here to refer to
another unique doctrine of conspiracy law, the Wharton Rule, 80 which states
that "when to the idea of an offense plurality of agents is logically necessary,
conspiracy, which assumes the voluntary accession to a crime of such a na-
ture that it is aggravated by a plurality of agents, cannot be maintained."81
The rule is based on the logic that conspiracy law is not meant to punish a
crime that definitionally requires more than one actor, it being unfair to
punish as conspiracy conduct which is already punishable as group activity.
Hence, while the Wharton Rule is not predicated on a theory of double
jeopardy,8 2 its purpose nonetheless is to eliminate the opportunity for doll-
ble punishment-a problem inherent in unilateral conspiracy because the
same conduct is often punishable as an attempt or solicitation to commit the
substantive offense. 83  Furthermore, the "degree-of-harm" rationale cannot
support the treatment as conspiracy of a supposed confederation of one de-
fendant and one government agent, as-the government agent does not add to
the degree of harm that the single defendant acting alone could ac-
comnplish. 8 4  If an agent subsequently discards a law-enforcement job in
favor of crime, the partnership so formed will be a true conspiracy and will
be punishable under bilateral standards.
Moreover, a combination comprised of a government agent and a defend-
ant will not be a "continuing focal point" for criminal activity. It seems un-
likely that a defendant previously arrested by a decoy-conspirator would be
amenable to forming a later conspiracy with unfamiliar persons. In fact, the
experience would probably foster a reluctance to form any further conspir-
acv.
The argument that "societal apprehensiveness" will be reduced by imple-
mentation of unilateral conspiracy statutes is also susceptible to attack. The
80. 2 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LANV § 1604 (12th ed. 1974).
81. Id. Offenses contemplating such concerted activity include adultery, bigamy, bribery,
dueling, and incest. For examples of the rule's application, see lannelli v. United States, 420
U.S. at 779-86; United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354 (1926); Norris v. United States, 34 F.2d 839
(3d Cir. 1929), revd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 619 (1930); People v. Wettengel, 98 Colo. 193,
58 P.2d 279 (1935); People v. Purcell, 304 111. App. 215, 26 N.E.2d 153 (1940).
The Model Penal Code, with its unilateral approach to criminal liability, expressly rejects the
idea embraced by the Wharton Rule. See MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft), supra note 44,
5.03.
82. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. at 782.
83. See generally Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Johnson].
84. If the police agent does contribute to the degree of harm which can be effected, the
police conduct has exceeded the bounds of law enforcement and the police agent should be held
accountable. Cf Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., commenting on
liability of police for outrageous conduct in entrapment cases).
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public awareness that law enforcement officers are becoming involved in
clandestine criminal activities and are, in effect, helping to create the crime
for which another will be prosecuted may itself elicit more negative public
reaction than does the awareness of ordinary conspiracies. 85
Upon observation of the shortcomings of the Model Penal Code's theory of
conspiracy in these areas, it is difficult to appreciate the appeal of the unilat-
eral approach. There is, indeed, a serious flaw in the logic underlying the
unilateral approach as it applies to the police agent who pretends to cooper-
ate. This logical shortcoming is readily apparent when three models of con-
spiracy relationships are compared.
Model Conspiracies
Model 1: X and Y agree to commit a crime. Both intend to accomplish
the desired result through the activity of their union. Both are
punishable by law.
Model 11: X and Z agree to commit a crime. Both intend to accomplish
the desired result through the activity of their partnership. X
is punishable by law; Z is incompetent to stand trial, but this,
fact is unknown to X.
Model III: X and P, a policeman, "agree" to commit a crime. X intends to
accomplish the desired result through the activity of their un-
ion. P's status as a police officer is unknown to X, and in mak-
ing the "agreement" P does not intend to accomplish the
stated object of their partnership. Instead, P has feigned
agreement only to gather evidence against X and to prevent X
from actually committing the agreed-to crime.
Evaluating each of these models according to the commonly-articulated
rationales of conspiracy, it becomes clear that the rationales apply to Models
I and II but not to Model III. All five reasons clearly apply to Model I: (1) X
and Y provide each other with moral support; (2) the crime is more readily
accomplished because two will work together to achieve it; (3) together, X
and Y can do more harm than X could do alone; (4) once the crime is com-
mitted, the partnership may continue to commit other crimes; (5) the public
is justified in feeling uneasy about the existence of such a confederacy. Simi-
larly, all five considerations apply to Model I. The fact that Z is incompe-
tent does not detract from the appropriateness of conspiracy as the charge,
for the proscribed evil came into being at the time of the formation of the
partnership.
On the other hand, Model III appears quite unlike Models I and I when
scrutinized in light of the standard conspiracy doctrine justifications. Not one
of the reasons for punishing conspiracy applies to Model III because, from
85. See Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Pro-
vocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Donnelly]. It was suggested there that
criticism aimed at police should instead be directed at the law itself.
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the outset, the Model III facts reveal no true threat of crime facilitation
through a conspiracy. What, then, has led the proponents of the unilateral
approach to contend that X's activity in Model III should be punished as
conspiracy? In order to justify the unilateral approach, the drafters had to
find some common element other than the person X in all three types of
cases. A careful study of the three models and the Code-based decisions
reveals that the common element is the "agreement"-the gravamen of the
offense of conspiracy.86
"Agreement"
Because an "agreement" is the gist of' the offense of conspiracy, it is unfor-
tunate that the case law has not precisely defined that term.8 7  This short-
coming is true of cases arising both before and after enactment of the Code.
"Agreement" has been variously defined as "the union of two or more
minds;" 8 "an advancement of the intention which each has conceived in his
mind;"' 9 and "concerted purpose." 90  The cases show that the "agreement"
has to be an agreement to work together toward one goal. For instance, in
State v. King, 9' defendant A was present when B stated he had a grievance
with C and intended to beat C. A volunteered that if B did so, B's fine
would be paid by A. B answered that he did not want anyone to pay' his
fine, but he subsequently mentioned to others that he was going to beat C
and that A or another would pay his fine for doing so. C was beaten by B,
just as both A and B had desired; yet A was acquitted on charges of conspir-
acy. Notwithstanding that the beating was the result each party had in-
tended, the court, distinguishing a defendant's acquiescence to the act fi'om
the requisite "concert of action," held there was no conspiratorial agree-
ment. 92
The correctness of such a decision becomes apparent when it is recognized
that the requisite agreement requires two types of intent.9 3 The first type is
an intent to enter into the particular agreement,9 4 often referred to as a
86. Compare State v. Happel, - Minn. -, 259 N.W.2d 600 (1977) (per curiam) (Model
11 type), with People v. Cardosanto, 84 Misc. 2d 275, 276, 375 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835 (1975) (Model
III type), and State v. Carbone, 10 N.J. 329, 337, 91 A.2d 571, 574 (1952) (Model I type).
87. For a lengthy discussion of the "agreement" requirement, see United States v. Varelli,
407 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1969).
88. Odneal v. State, 117 Tex. Crim. 97, 101, 34 S.W.2d 595, 597 (1931).
89. State v. Carbone, 10 N.J. 329, 337, 91 A.2d 571, 574 (1952).
90. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938).
91. 104 Iowa 727, 74 N.W. 691 (1898).
92. Id. at 729-30, 74 N.W. at 692.
93. See J. HALL, B. GEORGE, JR., & R. FORCE, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, 708 (3d
ed. 1976). See also People v. Atley, 329 Mich. 298, 310-11, 220 N.W.2d 465, 471 (1974); W.
CLARK & W. MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES § 9.01 (7th ed. 1967); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW
& PROCEDURE § 43, at 183-84 (12th ed. 1974); Harno, supra note 17, at 631.
94. See, e.g., Davidson v. United States, 61 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1932).
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meeting of the minds. 95  Mere association is not enough. 96  The parties
must have a common goal97 or common purpose. 98 Each person must be-
come "definitely committed to cooperate" toward that end. 99  The second
intent is the criminal intent. It is a specific intent, as required for the sub-
stantive crime. 100 For instance, intent to permanently deprive an owner of
the value or use of the owner's property would be required for conspiracy to
commit theft. Therefore, the first inquiry will be whether each person was a
party to the agreement; the second inquiry will be whether the object of the
agreement carried criminal consequences. 10 1 In the King case, the pro-
posed objective did have a criminal penalty; yet by deciding to act on his
own, defendant B negated any intent to agree and thus there was no con-
spiracy. Similarly, there is no true conspiracy where the other intent ele-
ment is absent. For example, if A and B agree to perform a legal act that
they mistakenly believe to be illegal, they are not liable as conspirators. 10 2
Both types of intent must be present to constitute conspiratorial agreement.
Mere acquiesence does not constitute agreement.1 03 More significantly,
even actual knowledge is not the equivalent of intent for purposes of finding
agreement. 10 4 Judge Learned Hand attributed confusion of the two to a
misunderstanding of the principle that everything done by each conspirator
is competent evidence against all of them. 10 5 That principle, he pointed
out, means only that a conspirator is criminally liable for the acts done by
others in furtherance of the project as he or she understood it. 10 6 Thus,
95. See, e.g., United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975); Reavis v. United States, 106 F.2d 982 (10th Cir.
1939); Hoffman v. United States, 68 F.2d 101 (10th Cir. 1933); Solomon v. State, 168 Tenn.
180, 76 S.W.2d 331 (1934).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Etley, 574 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Cloughessy, 572 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1977); People v. Cummings, 173 Cal. App. 2d 721, 343
P.2d 944 (1959). See also Commonwealth v. Goodyear, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 544, 344 A.2d 672
(1975). Conspiracy has been characterized as a "partnership." See, e.g., United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 253 (1940); Ong Way Jong v. United States, 245 F.2d
392, 394 n.2 (9th Cir. 1957). Mr. Justice Holmes coined the phrase "a partnership in criminal
purpose" in United States v. Kessel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971, 980 (7th Cir. 1975).
98. United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1969); Marino v. United States, 91 F.2d
691, 694 (9th Cir. 1937). Accord, Blodgett v. State, 310 A.2d 628 (Del. 1973).
99. United States v. Bostic, 480 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1973).
100. See United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1978). Proof of such specific intent is
not necessary, however, if such is not required for the substantive charge. United States v.
Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975). Accord, United States v. Squires, 581 F.2d 408 (4th Cir. 1978).
101. See Harno, supra note 17, at 631.
102. See, e.g,, Weniger v. United States, 47 F.2d 692, 693 (1931).
103. Hurst v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 599, 145 S.W.2d 520, 522 (1942).
104. United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 848 (2d Cir. 1938).
105. For a detailed explanation of Judge Hand's formative impact on the history of conspiracy
law, see Prim, supra note 61.
106. See United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1938).
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although knowledge is essential, 107 the focus of conspiracy remains on in-
tent. 108
The distinction between knowledge and intent is particularly important in
the resolution of a certain type of conspiracy case. If defendant A agrees to
sell liquor to B, knowing that B will, contrary to law, carry it across state
lines, has A made a conspiratorial agreement to transport liquor across state
lines? One approach to resolution of this issue was the stake-in-the-venture
test. 109 This test would require that a defendant have more than a passive
attitude toward the conspiracy's object-in short, "a stake in its out-
come."110 Although the test has been abandoned for the most part as too
restrictive,"' it did indicate the direction in which a solution could be
found, for it demonstrated that a party to the agreement must positively
desire the consequences. 112 That is, the test requires some measure of in-
tent in addition to muere knowledge of the criminal objective. a 13 The Model
Penal Code apparently approves of such an approach in relation to this type
of case: "Under the proposed Draft, the same purpose requirement that
governs complicity is essential for conspiracy: the actor must have 'the pur-
pose of promoting or facilitating' the commission of the crime."114 But the
drafters distinguished this from the feigned-agreement situation by charac-
terizing the salesperson-defendant as "a person whose relationship to a crim-
inal plan is essentially' peripheral."' 115 Therefore, when A assists B in an
illegal venture by selling B liquor, there is no conspiracy; but when a police
107. United States v. Johnson, 504 F.2d 622 (7th Cir, 1974); Jacobs v. United States, 395
F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Gisehaltz, 278 F. Supp. 434, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
People v. Lee, 23 Cal. App. 2d 168, 72 P.2d 572 (1937).
108. See State v. Moretti, 52 N.J. 182, 187, 244 A.2d 499, 502 (1968). In one interesting
unilateral case, People v. Smers, 398 Mich. 635, 248 N.W.2d 156 (1976), the court recognized
that intent of the informer was the key issue-an issue of fact, not of law. The jury accordingly
was directed to determine whether the informant "was a government informer secretly bent
upon frustrating the conspiracy while feigning or pretending to be a co-conspirator, or . . . a
willing Party, to an illegal venture," the unmistakable implication being that he could not be
both simultaneously. The informer-defendant was convicted. 1d.
109, The test was formulated in United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940).
See generally Developments, supra note 56, at 931.
110. United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940). See also United States v.
Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1964);
United States v. Di Re, 159 F.2d 818, 819 (2d Cir. 1947); United States v. Cianchetti, 315 F.2d
584 (2d Cir. 1963).
111. See United States v. Tramaglino, 197 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1952); Johns v. United
States, 195 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir 1952). But see United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir.
1976) (defendant's stake in the venture held "relevant" to question of participation).
112. Developments, supra note 56, at 931.
113. The Court in Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 US. 703 (1943), indicated that,
given a recurrence of sales acts involving a controlled substance (narcotics), intent sufficient to
constitute agreement could be inferred.
114. MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft), supra note 44, at comment 2, at 107.
115. Id.
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agent only pretends to aid B in an illegal venture, actually intending all
along to thwart B's plan, there is a conspiracy for which B is criminally
liable. The logic of this disparity is not entirely plain.
At any rate, these various articulations of the requirement of intent in the
conspiracy's "agreement" demonstrate the inadequacy of calling a police
agent's feigned complicity an "agreement." Such feigned complicity is the
exact opposite of the intent required for agreement, for it intends defeat,
rather than success, for the plan. If mere knowledge would not suffice, 116
then surely feigned agreement should not, as feigned agreement is even
further removed friom positive intent than is knowledge. The Model Penal
Code attempts to circumvent this by discarding the requirement of subjec-
tive agreement.'1 7 As one court noted: "The words 'agrees' and 'agreement'
have not been used as words of art denoting a 'meeting of the minds' and
Icontract.' "'118 The Code thus alters the common law offense so drastically
that the crime is effectively immune from any possible analysis in terms of
conspiracy's traditional theory. Under the bilateral approach, subjective
(dual-intentional) agreement was the gist of the offense, but under the uni-
lateral view, it is immaterial.119
Under the unilateral approach, the only relevant factor-and the drafters
conceded this-is that the defendant "has conspired, within the meaning of
the definition, in the belief that the other party was with him." 120 Preter-
mitting the unbridled disregard of the dictionary definition of the word "con-
spire," 121 one thing is clear: the unilateral view designates conspiracy as the
appropriate charge for "a firm purpose to commit a crime." 122 The "agree-
ment" of unilateral conspiracy is merely a legal fiction, a technical way of
transforming non-conspiratorial conduct into a prohibited conspiracy. In
other words, this new form of conspiracy punishes a criminal predisposition
once evidenced. In so doing, it ignores two reasonable alternatives pre-
sented by the offenses of solicitation and attempt.
116. See notes 105, 114 and accompanying text supra.
117. The vote on this issue was 12 to 10. MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft), supra note 44,
at comment 2, at 117.
118. Garcia v. State, - Ind. - 394 N.E.2d 106, 110 (1979). Nor, it might be added, have
the words been given their plain meaning when the situation is a feigned agreement.
119. MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft), supra note 44, at comment 2, at 104.
120. id. at 105,
121. "(1) to make an agreement with a group and in secret to do some act (as to commit
treason or a crime or carry out a treacherous deed): plot together. (2) to concur or work to one
end: act in harmony." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 485 (unabr. 1961). Recognizing this disparity, one judge wrote: "In my opinion the
... [unilateral theory] not only brushes aside fundamental precepts of our criminal law, but
also does violence to the common sense meaning of everyday English words in order to enun-
ciate a radically new legal concept." People v. Schwimmer, 66 A.D.2d 91, 411 N.Y.S.2d 922
(1978) (Titone, J., dissenting).
122. MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft), supra note 44, at comment 2, at 105.
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Alternative Charges
Because unilateral conspiracy penalizes demonstrated predisposition, it
seems unnecessary to define such conduct as conspiracy when two other
charges-solicitation and attempt-are available to the prosecution. 123 In-
deed, one court emphatically rejected the Code's result, stating:
If this is the law, we are, in eflkct, raising the crime of solicitation to
a Class B felony when the highest grade given to that crime by the legisla-
ture . . . is a Class D felons,. 124
Solicitation and conspiracy are separate and distinct offenses. Conspiracy
carries an increased punishment because concerted criminal activities pre-
sent a greater threat to the public than individual conduct. Where the
123. Compare Garcia v. State, __ Ind. __, 394 N.E.2d 106 (1979) (defendant convicted of
conspiracy to commit murder for arranging through intermediary to have husband killed), with
State v. Mandel, 78 Ariz. 226, 278 P.2d 413 (1954) (defendant convicted of attempted murder
under identical set of facts). Not confining his objections to the unilateral stance, one scholar has
proposed that in light of the alternative charges all of conspiracy law should be abolished. See
Johnson, supra note 83, at 1139. The American Civil Liberties Union has made the same
suggestion.
Consider the Code's definition of "Criminal Attempt":
A person is guilt) of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of
culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he:
(a) purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the atten-
dant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or
(b) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does or omits to
do anything with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause such
result without further conduct on his part; or
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he
believes them to be, is an act or ommission constituting a substantial step in a
course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.
MODEL PENAL CODE (Official Draft), supra note 2, at § 5.01(1). Following this definition, the
Code lists, inter alia, as "conduct which may be held to constitute a substantial step under
Subsection (1)(c)": "soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of
the crime." Id. § 5.01( 2)(g). Depending on the nature of the substantial step performed by the
defendant, he or she could be charged with attempted conspiracy or attempt to commit the
substantive offense. Generally, "attempted conspiracy" is a concept unknown to the law, and at
least one state court has explicitly rejected its being established as a "crime." See Silvestri v.
State, 332 So. 2d 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd, 340 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1976). The notion of
attempted unilateral conspiracy as a crime was, however, suggested as "conceivable" in De-
velopments, supra note 56, at 926-27 n. 35. In some cases, facts that would seem to constitute
an attempted conspiracy have resulted in the charge of "solicitation," the defendant being the
initiator. See, e.g., People v. Burt, 45 Cal. 2d 311, 288 P. 2d 503 (1955); State v. Blechman,
135 N.J.L. 99, 50 A.2d 152 (1946).
The Code defines "Criminal Solicitation":
A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting
or facilitating its commission he commands, encourages or requests another person
to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such crime or an attempt to
commit such crime or which would establish his complicity in its commission or
attempted commission.
Id. § 5.02(l).
124. People v. Hanley, 92 Misc. 2d 465, 467-68, 400 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1977), quoting
People v. Teeter, 86 Misc. 2d 532, 382 N.Y.S. 938 (1976).
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agreement of another is simulated and without an intent to perform there
is no concerted activity for which the crime of conspiracy, with its in-
creased punishment, wias intended. 125
In the absence of this approach and under the unilateral view, the fate of
the defendant hinges on the response of the person whose aid he or she
solicits. If the solicited party says "no," the defendant can be charged with
solicitation; 126 if the solicited party says "yes," without actually intending
agreement, the defendant faces a charge of conspiracy, with its increased
punishment. 127 And if it is the defendant whose aid is solicited, he or she is
liable for conspiracy even if the person who suggests the plan is a police
agent.
Contrasted with this pivotal arrangement should be the logic advanced in
the leading unilateral case, State v. St. Christopher. 128 The Supreme Court
of Minnesota upheld the defendant's conspiracy conviction and rejected the
alternative of finding such a defendant guilty of attempted conspiracy. That
alternative was deemed undesirable because "it would result in disparate
sentences for defendants whose conduct was the same, the length of sen-
tence turning on a fortuity." 129 Referring to the set penalties of its statutes,
the court explained:
Thus, if A agreed with B (a policeman who merely feigns agreement) to
commit murder, A would be guilty of attempted conspiracy and could re-
ceive a maximum of 10 years' imprisonment, whereas if A agreed with C
(who does not feign agreement), A could be guilty of conspiracy and re-
ceive a maximum of 20 years' imprisonment.1 30
With this tour de force, the court constructed what is tantamount to an
equal protection rationale for the unilateral doctrine.131  What it patently
ignored was the fact that the two situations differ considerably: in the first,
none of the justifications for penalizing conspiracy applies; in the second, all
the rationales apply. The argument simply makes too much of the idea of
"fortuity." If X shoots at Y and misses, while Z shoots Y and kills Y, the
criminal jurisprudence does not seek to punish both X and Z equally, even
though it is clear that both X and Z have exhibited a dangerous predisposi-
125. People v. Hanley, 92 Misc. 2d 465, 468, 400 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1977).
126. See note 123 supra.
127. Penalties for conspiracy vary widely from state to state. See Model Penal Code (Tent.
Draft), supra note 44, § 503, appendix B. The Code proposes that the conspiracy penalty be
equivalent to that of the conspiracy's most serious object-offense, excepting conspiracies to
commit capital offenses, which would be punishable to a lesser degree. Model Penal Code,
supra note 2, § 5.05(1). The same suggestion is made for the crime of attempt. Id. Ironically, §
5.05(2) permits a judge to impose a lesser penalty or even to dismiss the prosecution if the
defendant's conduct is "so inherently unlikely to result or culminate in the commission of a
crime that neither such conduct nor the actor presents a public danger."
128. 305 Minn. 226, 232 N.W.2d 798 (1975).
129. Id. at n.7, 232 N.W.2d at 8 n.7.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 234-35, 232 N.W.2d at 803-04.
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tion. 132 The punishment is commensurate with the harm sustained; this
principle is true for both the crime of attempt and the crime of conspi-
racy. 133 Nevertheless, this misleading "equal treatment" idea appears to be
132. E.g., compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b) (maximum sentence for murder is death)
with ILL. REX'. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 8-4(c)(1), 1005-8-1(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (maximum sen-
tence for attempted murder is 30 years); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-102(3), 18-1-105(1) (1973)
(maximum sentence for murder is death) with COLO. REV. STAT, §§ 18-2-101(4), 18-1-105(1)
(maximum sentence for attempted murder is 50 years): DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 636, 4209(b)
(1974) (maximum sentence for murder is death) with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 535, 4205(b)(1)
(mandatory sentence for attempted murder is life imprisonment); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
782.04(l)(a), 775.082(l)(West 1976) (maximum sentence for murder is death) with FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 777.04(1)(4)(a), 782.04(1)(a), 775.082(3)(b) (maximum sentence for attempted murder is
30 years); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-1-1, 35-50-2-3(b) (Burns 1979) (maximnum sentence for
murder is death) with IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-2-4, 35-41-5-1(a) (maximum sentence for at-
tempted murder is 50 years if aggravating circumstances are present); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 630:1, 630:1-a (Cure. Supp. 1979) (maximum sentence for murder is death) with N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 629:1(IV), 651:2(11-c) (maximum sentence for attempted murder is 30 years);
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.27, 60.06 (McKinney 1975) (maximum sentence for murder is death)
with N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.27, 110.05(1), 60.05(1), 70.00(3)(a)(i) (maximum sentence for at-
tempted murder is 25 years); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2502(a), 1102 (Purdon Cuin. Supp.
1979-80) (maxium sentence for murder is death) with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 905(a),
1103(2) (Purdon 1973) (maximum sentence for attempted murder is 10 years); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 9A.32.030(2), 9A.32.040, 9A.32.045, 9A.32.046 (1977) (maximum sentence for
murder is life imprisonment unless there are aggravating circumstances for which the death
penalty can be imposed) with WASH. REV. CODE ANN §§ 9A.28.020(3)(a), 9A.20.010(b)(i),
9A.20.020(a) (minimum sentence for attempted murder is 20 years).
133.Comparc ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b) (1977) (maximum sentence for murder is
death) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 §§ 8-2, 1005-8-1(5) (West Cure. Supp. 1979) (maximum
sentence for conspiracy to commit murder is 7 years). Note that in Illinois, a person may not be
convicted of both the inchoate and the principal offense. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
8-5,6; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-102(3), 18-1-105(1) (1973) (maximum sentence for murder is
death) with COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-102(3), 18-2-206(1), 18-1-105(1) (maximum sentence for
conspiracy to commit murder is 50 years); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 271(2)(b), 636, 4209(b)
(1974) (maximum sentence for murder is death); with DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 513, 636, 4205(b)(4)
(maximum sentence for conspiracy to commit murder is 10 years); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
782.04(1)(a), 775.082(1) (West 1976) (maximum sentence for murder is death) with FLA. STAT.
ANN, §§ 782.0 4 (1)(a), 777.04(3)(4)(a), 775,082(3)(b) (maximum sentence for conspiracy to commit
murder is 30 years); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-1-1, 35-50-2-3(b) (Burns 1979) (naxinmum sen-
tence for murder is death) with IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-41-5-2(a), 35-50-2-4 (maximum sentence
for conspiracy to commit murder is 50 years if aggravating circumstances are present); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 630:1, 630:1-a (Cuin. Supp. 1979) (maximum sentence for murder is death)
with N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 629:3(IV), 651:2 (11)(a) (1974) (maximum sentence for conspiracy
to commit murder is 15 years); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.27, 60.06 (McKinney 1975) (maximum
sentence for murder is death) with N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125,27, 105.15, 70.00(2)(b) (maximum
sentence for conspiracy to commit murder is 25 years); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2502(a),
1102 (Purdon Con. Supp. 1979-80) (maximum sentence for murder is death) with PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 903, 905(a), 1103(2) (Purdon 1973) (maximum sentence for conspiracy to commit
murder is 10 years); WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9A.32.030(2), 9A.32.040, 9A.32.045, 9A.32.046
(1977) (maximum sentence for murder is life imprisonment unless there are aggravating cir-
cumstances for which the death penalty can be imposed) with WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
9A.28.040(3)(a), 9A.20.020(a) (minimum sentence for conspiracy to commit murder is 20 years).
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the thrust of the unilateral doctrine. 134 Although the unilateral doctrine is
premised on the necessity of punishing an individual's willingness to enter
into a conspiratorial relationship, it is clear that the Code's formulations of
criminal attempt and criminal solicitation already provide the means for ac-
complishing that objective. The Code would punish under solicitation a per-
son who "'encourages or requests another person to engage in specific
conduct which would constitute [a] crime or an attempt to commit such a
crime .... ."35 Moreover, criminal attempt under the Code seems almost
specially designed to fit the case of the feigned conspiracy agreement, for a
person is guilty of attempt if he "purposely engages in conduct which would
constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them
to be ..... 136 Certainly these alternative charges define the conduct of a
defendant misled to conspire with a government agent. The coexistence of
these alternative charges with unilateral conspiracy poses no threat of double
punishment because the Code disallows the charging of more than one such
offense. 137
Aside from their ascendancy in theory, the alternative charges are prefer-
able for other reasons which the next "perspective" will reveal. The nebu-
lous concept of "agreement" makes the elements of the conspiracy offense
unclear, rendering a meaningful defense virtually impossible. The feigned
agreement also suggests a potential for police abuse, because the defendant
in such a case cannot commit the conspiracy crime unless the agent does his
or her part in making the "agreement." A unilateral-conspiracy defendant
thus faces an extremely disadvantageous position in court. These obstacles
present questions of due process.
THE DUE PROCESS PERSPECTIVE
Commentators have traditionally cautioned that conspiracy's potential for
abuse should be vigilantly scrutinized. 138 This warning is even more apt in
the context of unilateral conspiracy. Because this new crime is so dependent
upon police involvement, its potential for abuse is even greater than that of
bilateral conspiracy. In a desire to promote effective law enforcement, legis-
latures adopting the unilateral approach have created a vehicle that essen-
134. See generally Fridman, supra note 35. This is apparently the first coummentary urging a
unilateral approach. The author argues that two types of conspiracy, conspiracy determined by
the intention of one party and conspiracy determined by the objectively determined intentions
of two people, should receive identical treatment.
135. See note 123 supra.
136. Id.
137. See MODEL PENAL CODE (Official Draft), supra note 2, § 5.05(3). Of course, the Code's
suggestion is not binding on the states. In Saienni v. State, 346 A.2d 152 (Del. 1975), the
defendant was convicted of both attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder.
138. See generally BASSIOUNI, supra note 66, at 214; Goldstein, The Krulewitch Warning:
Guilt by Association, 54 GEO. L.J. 133 (1965); Klein, Conspiracy-The Prosecutor's Darling, 24
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1957); Conspiracy Dilemma, supra note 64; Note, Mass Demonstrations
and Criminal Conspiracies, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 465 (1965); Developments, supra note 56, at 920.
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tially denies an effective defense. The application of the conspiracy doctrine
to the feigned-agreement defendant evinces a societal anxiety about
crime-an anxiety greater than the uneasiness over the power of the state.
Naturally, unilateral conspiracy did not arise in a vacuum of legal passiv-
ity,. Rather, it arose amid and is symptomatic of a growing trend toward
legitimating law enforcement, however exercised, and punishing guilt, how-
ever evidenced. American judicial deference to covert law-enforcement tac-
tics actually began shortly before the twentieth century, with cases holding
that the government is entitled to use decoys and to conceal the identities of
its agents.13 9  Subsequently, such practices became regarded as "essential"
to law enforcement,140 and the "fhlse friend" received the Supreme Court
approval 141 it previously had been denied. 142 These practices have become
increasingly frequent in recent bilateral cases, with the government agent
playing an important role in the conspiracy. 143 Thus, the idea of govern-
menit infiltration inherent in the unilateral conspiracy situation can be
viewed as an extension of this tolerance.144  Not surprisingly, a recent uni-
139. E.g., Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420 (1896); Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S.
604 (1895).
140. In Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), Chief Justice Hughes stated:
Artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal en-
terprises .. . .The appropriate object of this permitted activity, frequently essential
to the enforcement of the law, is to reveal the criminal design; to expose the illicit
traffic, the prohibited publication, the fraudulent use of the mails, the illegal con-
spiracy, or other offenses, and thus to disclose the would-be violators of the law.
Id. at 441-42.
141. See Hoflh v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952). See also Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
142. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). In Gouled, the Court held that the
fourth amendment had been violated by a secret and general ransacking, notwithstanding the
fact that the initial intrusion was occasioned by a fraudulently obtained invitation rather than by
force.
143. E.g., United States v. Maddox, 492 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rosner,
485 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Morales, 477 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Leffier, 422 F.2d 1021 (9th
Cir. 1970).
144. The greatest extension of such tolerance occurred as technological improvement of elec-
tronic surveillance techniques advanced the effectiveness of police proximity with suspected
criminals. Prior to this time it was recognized that there was no right to be free from police
surveillance, provided the police had reasonable grounds for believing that the law was being
violated. See generally Donnelly, supra note 85, at 1096. The Supreme Court, however, sig-
nificantly decreased even that protection with its "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. See
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Katz focused on the place in
which conversation was electronically overheard, in order to determine whether an unreasona-
ble search had occurred. Later, in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), the Court
shifted the focus to the person hearing the conversation, giving approval to the "bugged" agent.
In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), the Court achieved the same result without
reliance on electronic apparatus, but left defendants at the mercy of their own trustfulness. In
Hoffa, a federal agent gained the suspect's confidence, attended meetings with the suspect, and
later testified to all he had heard. Although the Court admitted that protections against un-
reasonable searches and seizures can extend to oral statements, it held that the speaker had
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lateral case began with the proposition that the use of agents and decoys is
necessary." 145
The critical difference between unilateral and bilateral cases, however, is
that in a unilateral case the state plays an active role in creating the offense.
The offense cannot occur without the "agreement" of the government agent.
Thus, participation of the state in the unilateral context goes well beyond the
"ferreting out" of evidence for use against a defendant already engaged in
the commission of an offense. Rather, it provides one-half of what is needed
for the commission of the crime. In such cases, the effectiveness of the tac-
tics is exalted over the integrity of the law-enforcement process. 146
From a jurisprudential standpoint, unilateral conspiracy undermines the
legal system because of the necessary role that the state plays in proving the
crime that it had earlier aided in creating. The state must rely on police
conduct and police testimony for proof' of the criminal activity. For this
intended the agent to hear the discussion, and thus no right had been violated. See id. at
302-03. "Misplaced confidence" in the agent did not constitute a fourth amendment breach; it
was more an occupational hazard than anything else.
The rule derived from such cases, and which carries over to the unilateral conspiracy situa-
tion, is that the use of trickery in creating misplaced confidence in government agents is fair
play in the game of law enforcement.
145. See State v. Lavary, 152 N.J. Super. 413, 420, 377 A.2d 1255, 1258 (1977), rev'd per
curiam, 163 N.J. Super. 576, 395 A.2d 524 (1978).
146. The same type of attitude is mirrored in the recent pivotal case of Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976). In that case the Supreme Court refused habeas corpus relief for defendants
convicted in state proceedings in violation of fourth amendment rights. Fourth amendment
violations are distinguishable from other constitutional defects, said the Court, for they "do not
impugn the integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge evidence as inherently unreliable."
Id. at 479. Of course, it is noteworthy that the seminal case on the exclusionary doctrine, Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), had spoken of the concept of judicial integrity rather than the
integrity of fact-finding. See also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536-39 (1975). The
Powell Court, however, has placed effective law enforcement above this, by contending that the
purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, an end which could be served only remotely by
the remedy of habeas corpus relief. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 484.
Viewed in this posture, it is clear that unilateral conspiracy tactics come under the Stone v.
Powell canopy of judicial tolerance, because unilateral conspiracy (1) is not concerned with re-
striction of police strategy, and (2) aims at punishing "guilt" without the hindrance of legal rules
(here, the traditional definition of conspiracy) which obscure the facts. Both the Powell decision
and the model unilateral statute can be viewed as shortcuts directed at punishing criminality
once it is evidenced. In a backhanded way, if Stone v. Powell provides an imprimatur for illegal
searches and seizures by police, then the Code's unilateral conspiracy provision gives an out-
right approval to police-created one-man conspiracies.
In addition, Stone v. Powell represents a statement of comity and federalism. Its refusal to
disrupt state criminal determinations may also be relevant to the question of whether a unilat-
eral statute would be upheld. In Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934), the Court held that
conspiracy requires two guilty minds. That decision, however, impliedly was based on interpre-
tation of a bilateral state statute. Taken seriously, the Morrison decision would invalidate a
conspiracy conviction where the sole other conspirator has been acquitted. The case therefore
would extend beyond the feigned-agreement situation to other unilateral prosecutions con-
templated by the Code.
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reason, it leaves a defendant practically defenseless against an abuse of
police power. 147 In proving its case, the state has three prominent avenues.
First, the state may introduce evidence obtained by an agent equipped with
sound devices to transmit or record conversation. 148 Second, and in addi-
tion to the first, the state can use the "conspirator"-agent as its key wit-
ness. 149 Finally, the state can argue that the agreement should be inferred
from the participants' conduct as it is in bilateral cases. 150 Under the bilat-
eral approach, the requirement of a second true conspirator in addition to
the policeman reduces the potential for police-power abuse.
While the abuse potential may be apparent in the abstract, it is difficult to
point to the facts of existing unilateral cases as proof of its existence. Many of
the cases involved defendants who wanted help in committing murder and
actively sought another's assistance.151 Thus, there may be an emotional
reaction in favor of increased criminal liability. The new law must, however,
be evaluated in terms of its fairness in all situations in which it can be
applied.
Both the form and the substance of the statute are therefore relevant to
this inquiry. The questions to be asked include: (1) Does the model law
adequately explain to courts, legislatures, and defendants the type of con-
147. A defendant's position was disadvantageous enough under bilateral standards. Aside
from the procedural irregularities, a judicial weakening of the agreement requirement gave the
prosecution an added strength. See generally Developments, supra note 56, at 933-34. To a
certain extent, this relaxation of the agreement requirement was necessitated by the nature of
the crime itself. Because "secrecy and concealment are essential features of successful conspi-
racy," Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947), convictions under bilateral stat-
utes usually are based upon circumstantial evidence. See generally LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra
note 5, at 457. Moreover, standards of relevance are relaxed to facilitate such proof. id. Perhaps
the greatest impact this has had on the agreement aspect of a conspiracy prosecution is the
judicial dictate that the agreement may be inferred from the conduct of the parties. See, e.g.,
Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 211 (1939); United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d
236 (6th Cir. 1974); State v. Estrada, 27 Ariz. App. 38, 550 P.2d 1080 (1976); Griffin v. State,
248 Ark. 1223, 455 S.W.2d 822 (1970); People v. O'Connor, 48 Mich. App. 524, 210 N.W.2d
805 (1973). Accordingly, many cases have held that the agreement which must be proved may
be either express or implied. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 210 F.2d 45 (3d Cir. 1954);
United States v. Banks, 383 F. Stpp. 368 (D.S.D. 1974); Jones v. State, 8 Md. App. 370, 259
A.2d 807 (1969); Commonwealth v. Cameron, 247 Pa. Super. 435, 372 A.2d 904 (1977).
In a unilateral prosecution, it is unlikely that the agreement will have to be inferred, because
the "conspirator"-policeman in all likelihood will be available to testify that there was an express
agreement.
148. E.g., Saienni v. State, 346 A.2d 52 (Del. 1975); People v. Lanni, 95 Misc. 2d 4, 406
N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1978).
149. This practice is also possible under the bilateral approach, but in such a case there must
be an additional nonpolice conspirator. See People v. Atley, 392 Mich. 298, 318, 220 N.W.2d
465, 475 (1974) (Swainson, J., concurring). The judge who wrote this concurrence had his own
conspiracy conviction affirmed in United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977). All undercover agent played a major role in the case.
150. See note 147 supra.
151. See, e.g., Saienni v. State, 346 A.2d 152 (Del. 1975); State v. St. Christopher, 305
Minn. 226, 232 N.W.2d 798 (1975); People v. Lanni, 95 Misc. 2d 4, 406 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1978).
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duct prohibited? (2) What protections exist to insure that this license for
police activity will not be abused? Conceivably, there are two protections to
prevent mishandling of a unilateral conspiracy prosecution: the requirement
of an overt act and the defense of entrapment. Unfortunately, neither is
meaningful in the context of unilateral conspiracy.
Overt Act
At common law, the crime of conspiracy was complete and punishable as
soon as the agreement was made. 152 Presently, however, approximately
one-half of the state conspiracy statutes require an overt act. 153 Such a
requirement prescribes that in addition to the agreement there be an act
committed by either conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. 154 It is
not necessary that the act itself be unlaw4ul.155 The purpose of requiring
the overt act was to provide proof that the conspiratorial agreement was
meant to be carried out, and thus was a serious threat. 156 Accordingly,
152. Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U.S. 52 (1921). See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 106 Ala. 67, 17 So.
512 (1894); State v. Tebo, 256 Iowa 449, 127 N.W.2d 646 (1964); Garland v. State, 112 Md. 83,
75 A. 631 (1910). State v. Bacon, 27 R.I. 252, 61 A. 653 (1905); King v. Gill, 106 Eng. Rep. 341
(1818); The Poulterers' Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 813 (1611).
153. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 184 (West 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A-48 (West
1972); CA. CODE ANN. § 26-3201 (1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-2 (1977); N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 105.20 (McKinney 1975); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 423 (1958). See generally LAFAvE &
Sco-rr, supra note 5, at 476.
The federal conspiracy law, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976), also contains such a requirement.
154. See United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 208 (1940); United States v. King, 521 F.2d
61, 63 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385, 400 (2d Cir. 1966); United
States v. Johnson, 165 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1947); People v. Zamora, 18 Cal. 3d 538, 548, 557
P.2d 75, 81, 134 Cal. Rptr. 784, 790 (1976); State v. Moody, 223 Kan. 699, 704, 576 P.2d 637,
643 (1978); State v. Johnson, 548 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Mo. App. 1977); State v. Yormark, 117 N.J.
Super. 315, 330, 284 A.2d 549, 556 (1971).
155. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975); Braverman v. United States,
317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942); United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915); United States v.
Cooper, 577 F.2d 1079, 1085 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Sterkel, 430 F.2d 1262, 1263
(10th Cir. 1970); People v. Katzman, 258 Cal. App. 2d 777, 783, 66 Cal. Rptr. 319, 325 (1968);
State v. Rittiner, 341 So. 2d 307, 317 (La. 1976); State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 547, 175 P.2d
724, 732 (1946). In fact, the overt act may consist of constitutionally protected speech, United
States v. Donner, 497 F.2d 184, 192 (7th Cir. 1974), or even silence, if it is planned silence,
intended to facilitate the conspiracy. United States v. Eucker, 532 F.2d 249, 254 (2d Cir. 1976).
In a case in which two defendants and an undercover police officer all were named as con-
spirators in the indictment, the court held that even if the policeman could not he counted as a
conspriator the indictment could stand, for there remained two conspirators, and their act of
giving money to the policeman was the overt act. See People v. Teeter, 62 A.D.2d 1158, 86
Misc. 2d 532, 404 N.Y.S.2d 210, aff'd, 62 A.D.2d 1158, 404 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1978).
156. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957); State v. Dupuy, 27 Ariz. App.
187, 522 P.2d 1202, 1203-04 (1976). It also is said that the requirement affords the conspirators
a "locus poenitentiae"-a period of time in which they may withdraw from the agreement, and
so avoid liability. See, e.g., People v. Zamora, 18 Cal. 3d 538, 557 P.2d 75, 134 Cal. Rptr. 784
(1977).
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courts interpreting the overt act requirement have often regarded it as
necessary evidence of the conspiracy, rather than as an element of the
crime. 157
Ostensibly recognizing the value of the overt act requirement, the draf-ters
of the Model Penal Code incorporated such a requirement, stating that it
"affords at least a minimal added assurance, beyond the bare agreement,
that a socially dangerous combination exists." 158 Yet to consider this Code
requirement a general safeguard is naive. First, an overt act is not required
under the Code for first- and second-degree felonies. 159 This was an ex-
tensive abrogation of the overt act requirement of many states. 160 The
drafters reasoned that "the importance of preventive intervention [in serious
felony cases] is pro tanto greater than in less serious offenses." 161 Arguably,
the need for early intervention is greater when the contemplated crime is
more formidable. The requirement as promulgated, however, disregards the
possibility of police instigation of even first- or second-degree felonies in a
unilateral context. In such cases, the Code risks punishing a defendant who
does not fully intend that the plan be carried out. As a result, some states
have retained their overt act requirements for all conspiracy prosecutions
although otherwise generally accepting the unilateral approach.1 62 Even
more significantly, however, the apparent protection is not a safeguard be-
cause the Code explicitly allows an overt act to be committed by either
member of the conspiracy. 163 Apparently it is no defense that the overt act
was done by the police agent. Thus, it appears that an undercover agent
may perform an act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, and then the
state may use as its proof both his or her testimony as to the agreement and
the agent's act in furtherance of it.
Notwithstanding the Codels permissiveness as to the perpetrator of the
overt act, there may be some judicial protection through a pre-Code com-
mon law "essential act" test. This test, although infrequently invoked, con-
centrates attention on the person who performs the act, rather than automat-
ically attributing the act to both conspirators. Because the possibility of
abuse is present in any conspiracy prosecution, courts have, in the past,
157. E.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d
244 (1st Cir. 1976); Safarik v. United States, 62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1933). Contra, Hyde v.
United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912); United States v. Cohen, 583 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1978). In
soine states the statute specifies that no person shall be convicted of conspiracy unless an act in
furtherance of the agreement is alleged and proved. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-2(a)
(1977).
158. MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft), supra note 44, comment 2, at 141.
159. See MODEL PENAL CODE (Official Draft), supra note 2, § 5.03(5).
160. See id. § 5.03 and accompanying text.
161. Id.
162. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A-48 (West 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3201 (1977);
ILL. RE'. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-2(a) (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3302(1) (1974); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.175 (West Supp. 1979); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105.20 (McKinney 1975).
163. See MODEL PENAL CODE (Official Draft), supra note 2, § 5.03(5).
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drawn a line where what is termed the "essential act" is performed by a law
enforcement agent.' 64  For example, in King v. State,'6 5 a pre-Code deci-
sion, the court held that where "some act essential to the crime charged as
the object of the conspiracy" was performed by a government agent in] the
discharge of his or her duty, a single conspirator-defendant could not be
convicted. 166 The court in King demonstrated that its position was the judi-
cial treatment unanimously used in such feigned-agreement cases. 167 In one
case, absent a unilateral statute, a Michigan court rejected a conspiracy pro-
secution on sufficiency of the evidence; the concurring opinion concentrated
on the police informant's over-involvement. Application of the essential act
test is, however, generally limited to conspiracies of only one non-
government participant. 168  In another case, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held the test inapplicable when there was more than one
conspirator-defendant even though the government agent performed an es-
sential act.169 Despite its limitations, the test can and should be extended
to unilateral cases.
The statutory "overt act" requirement and the judicially-created "essential
act" test provide safeguards against conspiracy prosecution of non-
participating defendants. In the context of unilateral conspiracy, such stand-
ards, if used to discount the degree of participation by the government
agent, would reduce the impact of prefabrication and overzealous police
work. One of the essential act cases has also been explained as based upon a
theory of entrapment.170 Such interpretation is reasonable, as the same sort
of overreaching by the executive branch was checked, for many years, by
the defense of entrapment.
Entrapment
Because the government plays so prominent a role in unilateral conspir-
acy, the defense of entrapment seems highly relevant. Unfortunately, how-
164. In Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915), government inspectors in-
duced a man to bring Chinese aliens across the Mexican border. The inspectors explained to
him the means by which the Chinese could be brought across the border, the routes they
should follow, and the methods by which they could avoid arrest; in short, they planned the
crime. The court held that it would contravene public policy to convict the defendant in such
circumstances. See note 170 and accompanying text infra.
165. 104 So. 2d 730, 732 (Fla. 1958).
166. Id. at 732-33.
167. See cases cited in King v. State, 104 So. 2d at 733: Ventimiglia v. United States, 242
F.2d 620 (4th Cir. 1957); O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1931); DeMayo v.
United States, 32 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1929); Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir.
1915); State v. Dougherty, 88 N.J.L. 209, 96 A. 56 (1915).
168. 392 Nich. 298, 317, 220 N.W.2d 465, 474 (1924) (Swainson, J., concurring). The words
"essential act" were not used.
169. United States v. Seelig, 498 F.2d 109, 112-13 (5th Cir. 1974). See also note 143 supra.
170. See Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915), cited in LAFAVE & SCOTT,
supra note 5, at 476. But cf. United States v. Maddox, 492 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1974) (entrap-
ment defense does not extend to inducement by private citizens).
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ever, entrapment doctrine offers little reassurance of judicial protection,
either against unilateral conspiracy generally or against a unilateral prosecu-
tion brought about by overly aggressive police tactics. In fact, the rationale
of the entrapment defense is the same as the Code's purpose in imposing
criminal liability on the feigned agreement defendant-penalizing predispos-
ition to commit crime.171 Entrapment is the action of a law-enforcement
officer who, for the purpose of obtaining evidence of crime, induces a person
to commit a crime which, but for the inducement, that person would not
have committed. 172 While this definition appears relatively straightforward,
it admits of two distinct interpretations. The first focuses subjectively on the
defendant rather than the police. The second focuses on the degree of in-
volvement of the law enforcement agent. A unilateral conspiracy defendant's
chance of succeeding with an entrapment defense ultimately depends upon
the jurisdiction's interpretation.
The test under the first approach, followed by the majority of states and
the federal government, focuses on the defendant's "predisposition" 173 to
commit the crime. 17  The clearest articulation of this approach is found in
United States v. Russell. 175 In that case, an undercover narcotics agent who
was investigating the defendants' illicit drug manufacturing enterprise of-
fered them an essential ingredient which was legal, but difficult to obtain.
The Supreme Court, in refusing to accept an entrapment defense, held that
the agent's contribution to the enterprise was not so extensive as to violate
the fundamental fairness guarantee of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 17 6 The relevant factor to the Russell Court was that the
defendants were predisposed to commit the offense.177 This decision
171. See note 122 and accompanying text supra.
172. See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 5; F. WHARTON, WHAWRON'S CRIMINAL
LAw & PROCEDURE § 52 (14th ed. 1978).
It is often said that merely presenting the opportunity to commit crime does not constitute
entrapment. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 94-3-111 (1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-14 (1977).
173. The standards of proof of criminal predisposition have been said to be a fault in the new
entrapment doctrine. See generally Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163,
200-16 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Park].
174. See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 5, at § 48; Hardy, The Traps of Entrap-
meut, 3 Am. J. CRiM. LAW 165 (1974); Note, Entrapment: Time to Take an Objective Look, 16
WASHBURN L.J. 324, 337 (1976).
175. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). The Russell opinion divided defendants into camps of -unwary
criminal[s]" and "unwary innocent[s]," distinguished by their criminal predisposition or lack of
it. 1d. at 436. In its historical context, Russell seems out of place, coming as it did after the
exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
176. Moreover, the Court said that entrapment was inot of constitutional dimension at all. Id.
at 432. The Court indicated that an entrapment defense based on the degree of government
involvement in criminal activity has no constitutional significance. Id. at 433. It did say, how-
ever, that Congress could "adopt any substantive definition of the defense that it may find
desirable." id.
177. Id. at 436.
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minimized the fact that the crime would not have been committed but for
the government agent's action, just as in unilateral conspiracy it cannot be
committed absent the government agent's agreement.
Even more significant, for purposes of unilateral conspiracy, is the notion
that the entrapment defense is not "rooted . . . in any authority of the Judi-
cial Branch to dismiss prosecutions for what it feels to have been 'over-
zealots law enforcement.' "178 Rather, the defense is based on the idea
that the legislature could not have intended criminal punishment for a de-
fendant who was induced by the government to commit crime. 179 Under
this theory, the courts are simply legislative interpreters, and entrapment is
an implied legislative exception.18° Considered in this posture, the entrap-
ment defense is less viable in unilateral conspiracy cases: the feigned-
agreement offense cannot be challenged as entrapment per se, inasmuch as a
legislature has declared its intent to punish such a defendant.
It is also doubtfil that this majority approach to entrapment would pre-
clude conviction where the police agent-conspirator has planned substantially
all of the crime. If the defendant was "predisposed" to commit the crime, a
claim of entrapment will be rejected.181 Predisposition may be shown by,
among other things, evidence of the defendant's prior unlawful acts of the
same nature. 182 Not only may these acts be introduced to rebut an entrap-
ment defense, once it is raised, 183 they also may be admissible, according to
some courts, as a part of the prosecution's case-in-chief if it appears the
defendant intends to assert the defense. 18 4  For this reason, unilateral con-
spiracy defendants may be easy targets for aggressive police officers. Police
may select potential conspirators on the basis of prior convictions, urge them
178. This was the majority view in Russell. Id.
179. Id. at 435.
180. Fundamentally, the question is whether the defense, if the facts bear it out, takes
the case out of the purview of the statute because it cannot be supposed that
Congress intended that the letter of its enactment should be used to support such
a gross perversion of its purpose.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932).
181. Under the majority approach, the issue properly is raised by a plea of not guilty, and
the entrapment becolnes a question of fact for the jury. To the defendant's disadvantage, the
jury might consider the evidence of "predisposition" as substantive evidence of commission of
the crime. See notes 182 and 184 and accompanying text infra.
182. See Park, note 173 supra.
183. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d
891 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Clemons, 503 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1974); People v.
Schrader, 71 Cal. 2d 761, 457 P.2d 841, 80 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1969); People v. Price, 17 111. App.
3d 911, 309 N.E.2d 56 (1974); State v. Van Regenmorter, 465 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. 1971); Coin-
nonwealth v. Miller, 361 Mass. 644, 282 N.E.2d 394 (1972); State v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 326,
495 P.2d 1265 (1972).
184. See United States v. Cohen, 489 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Simon, 453
F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1971); State v. Frates, 160 Mont. 431, 503 P.2d 47 (1972); State v. Dolce, 41
N.J. 422, 197 A.2d 185 (1964).
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into "agreement," and testify against them. As long as the currently accepted
view stands, 18 5 entrapment will probably be ineffective as a defense.
The second approach to entrapment would afford a more likely defense,
for it concerns itself with the government's conduct, emphasizing the quality
or nature of the police involvement. 186 If the police tactics create a substan-
tial risk that a law-abiding person might succumb to the inducement, the
prosecution is precluded. 187 This minority approach reflects two public pol-
icy considerations: first, government should not "create" criminals,188 and
second, recognition of' the defense hy the courts will deter reprehensible
police conduct.189 Clearly, application of this theory of entrapment makes
sense when the crime charged is unilateral conspiracy. In a very real sense,
the agreeing government agent has "created" the crime. Furthermore, an
entrapment doctrine which seeks to deter unreasonable police activity is in-
perative if the potential for abuse is to be curtailed.
The drafters of the Code recognized that the unilateral approach pre-
sented serious pr o b lens of' entrapment,190 and, accordingly, the), proposed
the minority view as the Code's theory of entrapment.191 Unfortunately,
185. Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall have consistently taken the minority position,
dissenting in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), and Hampton v. United States, 425
U.S. 484 (1976). In Hampton, they first stated their preference for the "objective" entrapment
test which focuses on the police conduct; they suggested that even under the "subjective" test,
entrapment should be recognized where the government agent "deliberately sets tIp" the ac-
cused. Id. at 496-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Further, notwithstanding the definiteness of the decree in Russell, the majority there added
that an extreme case might compel it to nullify a conviction: "Me may some day he presented
with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due
process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to ob-
tain a conviction." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32.
186. See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 5, at ch. 5, § 48.
187. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAr. § 18-1-709 (1973).
188. See United States v. Healy, 202 F. 349, 350 (D. Mont. 1913).
189. See Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d 944, 948 (9th Cir. 1968).
190. See Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal
Code of the American Lae Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, (pts. 1 & 2) 61
COLUM. L. REV. 571, 957, 966 (1961). Professor Wechsler of the Columbia Law School was
Chief Reporter for the Model Penal Code.
191. It reads:
(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such
an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the
commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in
conduct constituting such offense by either:
(a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that
such conduct is not prohibited; or
(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial
risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are
ready to commit it.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3) of this Section, a person prosecuted for
an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his
conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be
tried by the Court in the absence of the jury.
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the Code was proposed before the Supreme Court's weakening of the en-
trapment defense. 192 Moreover, the drafters did not propose the adoption
of both the conspiracy and entrapment sections jointly, nor did they suggest
that the provisions should be read in pari materia. Hence, the conspiracy
section has been widely adopted,1 93 yet the majority of states continue to
follow the Supreme Court's "predisposition"-oriented theory of entrapment.
Because the entrapment provisions of the Code have not generally been
enacted, the defense is usually unavailable in prosecutions based on the
Code theory of conspiracy. Entrapment has not been addressed in many of
the decisions; this is perhaps explained by the fact that in most of the cases,
predisposition was apparent.194 Thus, one court, relying on the predisposi-
tion analysis, dismissed an entrapment defense summarily,195 while another
conceded that entrapment could be a problem generally, without addressing
the issue directly.1 96 A third court declined to accept a defendant's ar-
gument that no predisposition had been shown to counter her defense of
entrapment by declaring that "predisposition is evidenced by previous con-
viction of crime, reputation for criminal activity, ready compliance with
minimal inducement, or easy yielding to the opportunity to commit the of-
fense." 197 This statement reflects the underlying fault of applying the "predis-
position" test in this context: because the offense is committed by agreement,
the test is instantly satisfied; the defendant's compliance with a government
agent's plan will be regarded as proof that the defendant was not entrapped.
"Predisposition" both justifies the statute and denies a defense under it.
To assert the defense of entrapment is to admit, necessarily, that the
charged offense was committed. 198 Therefore, entrapment should be distin-
(3) The defense afforded by this Section is unavailable when causing or threaten-
ing bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based
on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person
perpetrating the entrapment.
MODEL PENAL CODE (Official Draft), supra note 2, § 2.13 (formerly § 2.10).
192. The Code was proposed in 1962. Russell and Hampton, which indicate the broad in-
terpretation of "predisposition," were both decided more than 10 years later.
193. See note 3 supra.
194. For instance, in Garcia v. State, __ Ind. , 394 N.E.2d 106 (1979), the defendant
previously had indicated her desire to have her husband killed.
195. See People v. Lanni, 95 Misc. 2d 4, 8, 406 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1013 (1978). Cf. King v.
State, 104 So. 2d 730, 732 (Fla. 1958) (possible entrapment recognized but not used as basis for
decision).
196. See People v. Schwimmer, 66 A.D.2d 91, 95, 411 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925 (1978).
197. State v. Lavary, 152 N.J. Super. 413, 420, 377 A.2d 1255, 1258 (1977), rev'd per curiam on
other grounds, 163 N.J. Super. 576, 395 A.2d 524 (1978), citing State v. Talbot, 71 N.J. 160,
167, 364 A.2d 9, 13 (1976).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 433 F.2d 760 (1st Cir. 1970); Brown v. State, 248
Ark. 561, 453 S.W.2d 50 (1970); Zinn v. State, 134 Ga. App. 51, 213 S.E.2d 156 (1975); People
v. Pugh, 48 Mich. App. 242, 210 N.W.2d 376 (1973); State v. Williams, 84 S.D. 547, 173
N.W.2d 889 (1970). But see United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975) (overruling
earlier cases); State v. Nelsen, 228 N.W.2d 143 (S.D. 1975).
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guished from the defense than an essential element of the crime is ab-
sent. 199 The obvious difference is that under the latter theory the state has
no case at all. This distinction is especially important in unilateral conspir-
acy, because the "essential elements" are said to be the same as those in
bilateral conspiracy,2 0 0 yet the element of "agreement" is altogether differ-
ent. Because of the confusion as to the crime's essential elements, a defense
is difficult to prepare.
Statutory Interpretation
Although conspiracy is an offense both at common law and Under statute,
nearly all law defining the traditional crime has been a product of the
courts. 2 0 1 Recognizing this, the drafters of the Code set out to create a
complete statutory definition of the scope and components of the new crime.
Yet the replacement of nearly 700 years' worth of judicial explication is not a
simple task, and judicial interpretation has not been eliminated. By adopting
section 5.03 of the Model Penal Code, a legislature ostensibly preempts the
former bilateral definition of conspiracy.2 0 2  Nevertheless, the question
whether the new offense is a "conspiracy," legally punishable as such, has
been raised in every reportedi unilateral case since the Code. The courts'
answers have not been uniform.
This disparity', or confusion, is occasioned by three factors. The first is the
failure of the Code to define its terms: the definition of conspiracy in the
Code leaves much to be inferred. For instance, the Code does not define
This idea is attacked in Groot, The Serpent Beguiled Ale and I (Without Scienter) Did
Eat-Denial of Crime and the Entrapment Defense, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 254, 278.
199. The distinction arises in cases where the absence of a victim's consent is an essential
element of the offense. So, for instance, if the "victim' (possibly an undercover policeman) is
not deceived, the defendant cannot be guilty of obtaining money by false pretenses. See, e.g.,
People v. Schroeder, 132 Cal. App. 2d 1, 281 P.2d 297 (1955). Sometimes, under such cir-
cuinstances, a conviction for attempt will be upheld. See, e.g., State v. Peterson, 109 Wash. 25,
186 P. 264 (1919).
200. See Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75 COLuM. L.
REV. 1122, 1136 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Conspiracy].
201. MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft), supra note 44, comment 2, at 96.
202. A legislature is free to change the common law defining crime. Gilbert v. United States,
370 U.S. 650, 655 (1962) (definition of forgery). When a legislature does change the common
law definition, that statutory definition prevails over the common law definition. See People v.
Pociask, 14 Cal.2d 679, 96 P.2d 788 (1939); State v. Coomes, 170 Neb. 298, 102 N.W.2d 454
(1960); Traxler v. State, 96 Okla. Crim. 231, 251 P.2d 815 (1952). Consequently, courts have
held that where a criminal offense is created and defined statutorily, its previous common law is
abrogated and cannot be resorted to in order to add or detract from the effect of the statutory
language. See, e.g., State v. DiPaglia, 247 Iowa 79, 71 N.W.2d 601 (1955); Bentley v. Com-
monwealth, 269 S.W.2d 253 (Ky. 1954). Some states, however, indulge a presumption that the
legislature did not intend to alter the common law unless such an intention is clearly expressed.
See, e.g., Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452, 25 A.2d 354 (1942). Such rules inevitably will -affect
judicial handling of state-adopted versions of the Code.
203. See United States v. Brandenberg, 144 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1944); Jones v. State, 101 Ca.
App. 851, 115 S.E.2d 576 (1960).
[Vol. 29:75
19791 UNILATERAL CONSPIRACY
the word "agrees," even though this is unmistakably the key element of
guilt. Where a statute creating or describing a criminal offense uses an unde-
fined term, the general practice is to give the term its common law mean-
ing. 20 3 Thus, it is only natural that courts should refer to common law for
the definition of agreement. But the common law requires specific intent on
the part of at least two persons. 20 4  So when the common law is employed
to elucidate the statute, the statutory meaning is abrogated. The drastic alt-
eration the Code seeks to effect in suggesting that a government agent can
be counted as a conspirator augments the confusion. Under common law,
the result in such a case was a unanimous judicial veto. 20 5  Because that
result is so deeply ingrained in our legal tradition, certain courts have been
unwilling to ascribe a contrary intent to the legislators.206
Second, lack of clarity in legislative history fosters and supports such judi-
cial reluctance. When a legislature mentions that it does not mean to change
the well-established law, it doubles the coufusion. 20 7 In both New York and
New Jersey, decisions existed with opposite holdings. 20 8  Those states have
recently resolved their inner conflicts, 20 9 but reached opposite results. 2 10
New Jersey, in fact, decided against the unilateral approach by distinguish-
ing the wording of its unilateral statute firom the wording of New York's
unilateral statute and quoting an Illinois case.211 Ironically, the drafters of
204. See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
205. See, e.g., State v. Dougherty, 88 N.J.L. 209, 96 A. 56 (1915); Delaney v. State, 164
Tenn. 432, 51 S,W.2d 485 (1932); Weathered v. State, 128 Tex. Crim. 263, 81 S.W.2d 91
(1935); Odneal v. State, 117 Tex. Crim. 97, 34 S.W.2d 595 (1931); Woodworth v. State, 20 Tex.
App. 375 (1947).
206. E.g., State v. Mazur, 158 N.J. Super. 89, 99, 385 A.2d 878, 884 (1978); People v.
Hanley, 92 Misc. 2d 465, 467-68, 400 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (County Ct. Special Term 1977).
207. See, e.g., Garcia v. State, - Ind. -, 394 N.E.2d 106 (1979).
208. See State v. Mazur, 158 N.J. Super. 89, 385 A.2d 878 (1978);. State v. Lavary, 152 N.J.
Super. 413, 377 A.2d 1255 (1977), revd per curiam, 163 N.J, Super. 576, 395 A.2d 524 (1978);
People v. Lanni, 95 Misc. 2d 4, 406 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1978); People v. DiDominick, 94 Misc. 2d
392, 406 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1978); People v. Teeter, 86 Misc. 2d 532, 382 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1976);
People v. Cardosanto, 84 Misc. 2d 275, 375 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1975); People v. Hanley, 92 Misc. 2d
465, 400 N.Y.S.2d 319 (County Ct. Special Term 1977).
209. See State v. Lavary, 163 N.J. Super. 576, 395 A.2d 524 (1978) (per curiam); People v.
Schwimmer, 66 A.D.2d 91, 411 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1978).
210. New York approved the unilateral approach, People v. Cardosanto, 84 Misc. 2d 275, 375
N.Y.S.2d 834 (1974); New Jersey rejected it, State v. Mazur, 158 N.J. Super. 89, 385 A.2d 878
(1978).
211. See State v. Mazur, 158 N.J. Super. 89, 101, 385 A.2d 878, 884 (1978), cited with
approval in State v. Lavary, 163 N.J. Super. 576, 395 A.2d 524 (1978) (per curiam).
Interestingly, the Illinois case relied upon, People v. Ambrose, 28 I11. App. 3d 627, 329
N.E.2d 11 (1975), was not on point, and, inasmuch as the conviction of the Illinois defendant
was affirmed, the court's holding on the statutory interpretation amounted only to dicta:
The state would have this court read the conspiracy statute of the Illinois Criminal
Code to hold that only the intent of the individual defendant is necessary in a
conspiracy case. The state feels that it is not an elment of the conspiracy to prove
that the co-conspirator . . . needed to have the intent to agree with the defendant
and the intent to carry out the scheme. With this we cannot agree. Changes in our
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the Code had set out to remedy the vagueness which existed under bilateral
conspiracy law. 212
Third, the Code fails to set out precisely the elements of the new crime.
In retrospect the bilateral law was comparatively clear. The traditional crime
required the proof of' certain elements: the criminal act (agreement), the
criminal intent, the object of the conspiracy, and the requisite plurality; in
addition, an overt act requirement frequently was imposed. 213  While it is
said that the elements of' unilateral conspiracy are the same, 214 in actuality,
they are not: agreement and intent, as formerly understood, are abrogated;
so, except superficially, is the requisite plurality. This leaves only the object
of' the conspiracy, in addition to the Code's sometime requirement 215 of an
overt act, as the elements identical under bilateral law. Because the due
process clause protects an accused against conviction except upon proof,
beyond a reasonable doubt, of every essential element,216 unilateral defend-
ants would benefit greatly by a definitive statement of the true elements of
the new crime.
Operating in the absence of a precise ruling, unilateral defendants are
attempting to defend by using a defense available to defendants in bilateral
cases. That is, the)' continue to argue that a government agent cannot be a
"conspirator," and agreement with such a person is not "agreement" for
purposes of conspiracy law.217 But raising such a defense before courts
which approve of or acquiesce to the unilateral theory is futile. Most of these
criminal code in recent years provide that the co-conspirators do not have to be
prosecuted or even be guilty of an offense in order to convict a defendant of con-
spiracy. Yet, the older case law requiring two or more people for a conspiracy is
still valid. It would be absurd to claim a conspiracy could be entered into by one
individual alone. By the terms of our statute the crime of conspiracy involves an
agreement. The definition of agreement implies an intent to agree between a
minimum of two people. Therefore the state's contention that the intent of a co-
conspirator to agree with the defendant to commit armed robbery is unnecessary is
fallacious.
Id. at 629, 329 N.E.2d at 14. The dicta of Ambrose appears to mean that the unilateral ap-
proach as it pertains to a policeman-plus-defendant conspiracy has been rejected in Illinois.
The Mazur court also distinguished the unilateral cases of Saienni v. State, 346 A.2d 152
(Del. 1975); State v. St. Christopher, 305 Minn. 226, 232 N.W.2d 798 (1978); and People v.
Cardosanto, 84 Misc. 2d 275, 375 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1975), stating that in each of those cases, the
state statutes had "specifically permitted" the finding of a conspiracy despite the lack of mental
state of one alleged conspirator. See Mazur v. State, 158 N.J. Super. 89, 101, 385 A.2d 878, 884
(1978).
212. See generally Conspiracy, supra note 200.
213. For a discussion of these elements generally, see Developments, supra note 56, at 925-
26.
214. See Conspiracy, supra note 200.
215. See note 153 and accompanying text supra.
216. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
217. See, e.g., Garcia v. State, Ind. __, 394 N.E.2d 106 (1979); Saienni v. State, 346
A.2d 152 (Del. 1975); State v. St. Christopher, 305 Minn. 226, 232 N.W.2d 798 (1975).
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courts have simply stated that it is irrelevant that one of the conspirators was
only feigning agreement. 21 8
Rejection of this defense also has been explained on the ground that such
an argument is identical to an argument of factual impossibility, 219 which
traditionally has not been a defense to conspiracy. 220 This analogy to the
factual-impossibility theory, albeit seductive, is erroneous. Factual impossi-
bility has not been allowed as a defense to conspiracy because the basic
justifications for punishing conspriacy-the evils inherent in numbers-are
not mitigated by the presence of unknown factors. In the case of a defend-
ant-plus-police-agent conspiracy, however, none of the justifications is
applicable. The defense of impossibility is not the same as a claim that there
never was a conspiracy. 2
21
If the urging of the traditional defense bespeaks a misinterpretation of the
model statute and its progeny, a question arises as to why the new law has
not been attacked on constitutional grounds. Generally, when a statute does
not make clear the conduct which is proscribed, it can be challenged under
the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 222 The doctrine will be employed to de-
clare a law unconstitutional, under due process standards, if "men of com-
mon intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application." 223 In light of the differing results reached by the state courts,
it would seem that such a doctrine might find application in the unilateral
conspiracy context. The argument, however, would probably fail: the con-
218. E.g., Garcia v. State, __ Ind. -, 394 N.E.2d 106 (1979); State v. St. Christopher, 305
Minn. 226, 232 N.W.2d 798 (1975); People v. Lanni, 95 Misc. 2d 4, 406 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1978).
219. See State v. Lavar, 152 N.J. Super. 413, 432-33, 377 A.2d 1255, 1265 (1977), rev'd per
curiam, 163 N.J. Super. 576, 395 A.2d 524 (1978).
220. See State v. Moretti, 52 N.J. 182, 187, 244 A.2d 499, 502 (1968). See generally LAFAvE
& SCoTT, supra note 5, at 474-76.
221. This distinction was recognized in the unilateral case of State v. Mazur, 158 N.J. Super.
89, 385 A.2d 878 (1978). That court noted that if the object of a conspiracy is factually impossi-
ble to achieve, the conspiracy is still punishable if two persons intended agreement, for agree-
ment is the essence of conspiracy. See id. at 98, 385 A.2d at 883.
222. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (reversed conviction under law
making it a penal offense to be a "gangster"). See generally Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional
Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes
of Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205 (1967); Aigler, Legislation in
Vague or General Terms, 21 MICH. L. REV, 831 (1923); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
223. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). Accord, Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368
U.S. 278 (1961). See also Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Jordan v. DeGeorge,
341 U.S. 223 (1951); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927). It is this principle upon which the ex post facto clause is based. Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). But cf NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963):
The objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not depend upon ab-
sence of fair notice to a criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of legis-
lative powers, but upon the danger of tolerating . . . the existence of a penal statute
susceptible of sweeping and improper application.
Id. at 432-33.
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stitutional claim may be rejected if it appears that the ambiguity is being
asserted merely to evade the law.224 Because a unilateral defendant en-
gages in the proscribed conduct without knowing the other "conspirator" is a
government agent, the argument could only be that he or she would not have
made the agreement had the identity of the other party been known. Such
an argument exposes the specific intent of the accused and would therefore
probably be of no avail.
The most effective defense for a unilateral defendant may be the defense
of' conspiracy against oneself. In a recent case, the defendant was accused
of' agreeing with a "hit man" to kill several persons, including his former
wife and the judge who conducted their divorce hearing. 225  Unknown
to the defendant, the "hit man" was actually an FBI informant, and the
FBI videotaped and photographed meetings between the two men. De-
spite the flins and the informant's key testimony, the case has resulted in
two mistrials because of two hung juries.225 The once-improbable defense,
somewhat effectively urged by this defendant, 226 was that the real conspiracy
occurred between the former wife and the FBI-a plan to convict an inno-
cent man; "[t]he jury apparently could not agree on which conspiracy story
to believe. " 227  With this kind of tactic, the history of conspiracy law has
come full-circle-back to conspiracy to abuse the legal process. 228  Police
tactics of feigning agreement have demonstrated their self-defeating poten-
tial.
The unilateral theory as applied to the conspiracy of a defendant and a
police officer has not remedied the shortcomings of the traditional crime.
Instead, it has created overwhelming potential for abuse by the state, and,
even in the absence of judicial veto through a finding of entrapment, it ma'
ultimately prove self-defeating. If it lends itself to abuse and fosters public
distrust of' law enforcement, is such a unilateral approach worthwhile? Cer-
tainly not, especially because the charges of solicitation and attempt are al-
ready available. It has long been recognized that there are enough evils
inherent in the charge of conspiracy; 229 it is neither necessary nor wise at
this point to add to them.
224. See, e.g., United States v. Korpan, 354 U.S. 271 (1957); United States v. Five Gambling
Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1952).
225. See Millionaire Wins Mistrial in Murder-For-Hire Case, Chi. Trib., Jan. 23, 1979, at 2,
Col. 1.
226. Id.
227. Id. In another case, Beasley v. State, 360 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), the
defendant, a lawyer, was approached by a woman-actually a state agent-seeking to purchase
marijuana. Allegedly aware of the true identity of another government narcotics agent, the
defendant arranged a meeting between the two. By doing this, the defense argued, the lawyer
expected to aid in law enforcement; instead, he was charged criminally. The defense was not
successful. His conviction was confirmed because the undercover narcotics agent he called upon
to meet the prospective buyer was not authorized to sell narcotics in discharge of his duties. Id.
at 1277.
228. See notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra.




"[A] legal principle commands less respect when extended beyond the
logic that supports it." 230  What the Model Penal Code proposes as "unilat-
eral" conspiracy bears little resemblance to the traditional crime of conspi-
racy when applied to the case in which one of the co-conspirators is a police
agent or informant merely feigning agreement. Historically, a conspiracy
prosecution for this combination would not lie. In such a case, not one of the
many rationales for punishing conspiracy is present, for conspiracy is aimed
at organized numbers bent on organized criminal activity. What the Code
deems a threat sufficient to justify punishment is the defendant's firm dispos-
ition to commit a crime with others. Prior to the Code, and unchanged
under it, such disposition is punishable by the law of attempt or the law of
solicitation once dangerousness is evidenced. For these reasons, the newly
created crime makes little sense theoretically.
It also makes little sense because the potentials for abuse in detecting and
proving unilateral conspiracy are quite serious: the government agent must
play half the role of creating the conspiracy in order to detect it. Further,
the chances of miscarriage of justice are heightened by the Supreme Court's
virtual elimination of the entrapment defense. Under the prevailing en-
trapment theory, the focus is on the defendant's "predisposition," rather than
on the quality of government involvement. Thus, a defendant who "agrees"
with a government agent to commit a crime simultaneously negates an en-
trapment defense. Because of the absence of judicial protection, and be-
cause unilateral conspiracy is such a radical change from the prior law, it is
unclear how a defendant, wrongly accused, could possibly defend against
such a charge. Most defendants are still unsuccessfully arguing that two
guilty minds are needed, but this defense is irrelevant under a unilateral
statute. It can succeed only where a court declines to follow the full letter of
the unilateral law.
This tendency of the unilateral theory to attract executive-branch abuse
may eventually produce public distrust of both law-enforcement activity and
the legal process itself.2 31 With solicitation and attempt already available to
punish the guilty, unilateral conspiracy exacts too high a price from the crim-
inal justice system.
230. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 786 (1975).
231. Although proposal of the unilateral approach was labelled a reform, common law con-
spiracy theory is not se'en as promoting justice. Moreover, the unilateral approach is not likely
to alter that. In recent years there have been a number of well-publicized conspiracy trials,
each of them having one thing in common: a refusal of the juries to place credence in the
government's case. See, e.g., Caldwell, Angela Davis Acquitted on All Charges, N.Y. Times,
June 5, 1972, at 1, col. 2; Berrigan Case a Mistrial On Main Plotting Charge, N.Y. Times,
April 6, 1972, at 1, col. 2; Chicago Seven Cleared of Plot; 5 Guilty on Second Count, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 19, 1970, at 1, col. 3; 7 Youths Freed in Oakland in 1967 Draft Disorder, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 30, 1969, at 55, col. 1. The result of this perceived abuse of prosecutorial discre-
tion has been a weakening of the credibility of the legal system. BASSlOUINI, supra note 66, at
214.
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